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THE SUPREME COURT’S LOVE–HATE 
RELATIONSHIP WITH MIRANDA 
KIT KINPORTS*
In recent years, the Supreme Court has enjoyed a love–hate 
relationship with its landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona.  While the 
Court has not hesitated to narrow Miranda’s reach, it has also been wary of 
deliberate efforts to circumvent it.  This pragmatic approach to Miranda 
can be doctrinally unsatisfying and even incoherent at times, but it 
basically maintains the core structure of Miranda as the police have come 
to know and adapt to it. 
 
Last Term provided the first glimpse of the Roberts Court’s views on 
Miranda, as the Court considered three cases: Maryland v. Shatzer, Florida 
v. Powell, and Berghuis v. Thompkins.  This Article examines each opinion 
through a pragmatic lens, with an eye towards ascertaining whether the 
Roberts Court remains committed to the pragmatic approach taken by its 
predecessors.  While the Government prevailed on every issue raised by the 
three cases, the opinions vary in their fidelity to pragmatic norms. 
The Article concludes that, even if Shatzer and Powell can be 
dismissed as effecting only incremental changes in the law—in the rules 
protecting those who invoke their Miranda rights, defining custody, and 
requiring that the warnings reasonably convey each of the rights Miranda 
guarantees—Thompkins cannot be defended on pragmatic grounds.  In 
effect, the decision in Thompkins allows the police to begin interrogating a 
suspect immediately after reading the Miranda warnings, without first 
securing a waiver of Miranda, and then to use anything she says—even 
hours later—to demonstrate that she impliedly waived her rights.  
Thompkins thus essentially reduces Miranda to a mere formality, requiring 
that warnings be read and otherwise leaving criminal defendants protected 
only by the same voluntariness due process test that Miranda was designed 
to replace.  To the extent Thompkins signals a change in the Court’s 
attitude towards Miranda, it comes at a particularly critical time given 
 
* Professor of Law and Polisher Family Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Pennsylvania 
State University Dickinson School of Law. 
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recent suggestions that Congress create an exception to Miranda for 
terrorism suspects. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s recent attitude towards its landmark ruling in 
Miranda v. Arizona1 seems to be one of studied ambivalence.  On the one 
hand, the Court has ruthlessly cut back on Miranda, construing it narrowly2 
and creating exceptions,3 thereby “[w]eakening” its protections and 
“softening [its] impact.”4  On the other hand, the Court has resisted blatant 
attempts to subvert Miranda, whether on the part of Congress or individual 
police officers.  In my view, the Court has adopted a pragmatic approach to 
Miranda.  While it can be doctrinally unsatisfying and even incoherent at 
times, this pragmatic approach basically maintains the essential core 
structure of the Miranda rules and exceptions as the police have come to 
know them, while being wary of deliberate efforts to circumvent them.5
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Miranda has always been 
surrounded by controversy.  Even though the five-to-four decision was in 
 
 
1 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring that certain “procedural safeguards” be accorded to 
suspects who are both in custody and subjected to interrogation). 
2 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (requiring that invocations of the 
Miranda right to counsel must be unambiguous); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436–
39 (1984) (holding that traffic and Terry stops do not satisfy the Miranda definition of 
“custody” even though they are Fourth Amendment “seizures”); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 
U.S. 291, 294–95, 300–03 (1980) (finding that police officers did not engage in interrogation 
when one commented to another within suspect’s earshot, “God forbid one of [the 
handicapped children] might find [the murder weapon] . . . and hurt themselves”). 
3 See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 633 (2004) (creating an exception to 
the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine for physical evidence discovered as the result of a 
Miranda violation); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (refusing to apply the fruits of 
the poisonous tree doctrine to consecutive-confession cases, where a Miranda violation is 
followed by warnings and a second statement); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 
(1984) (recognizing a public safety exception to Miranda). 
4 Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, 
How We Got It—and What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 178, 184 (2007); see 
also Arthur J. Goldberg, Escobedo and Miranda Revisited, 18 AKRON L. REV. 177, 182 
(1984) (arguing that Miranda has been left “twisting slowly in the wind”). 
5 Cf. Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, 
and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1061 
(2001) (observing that most of the Supreme Court opinions creating exceptions to Miranda 
“involved a good faith or unintentional violation of the prophylactic rule, coupled with 
particularly high costs for implementing the rule”). 
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many respects a compromise6—the Court did not ban any particular 
interrogation technique7 or require the presence of counsel during police 
interrogations8—it immediately encountered resistance.  Just two years 
after the Court issued the decision, Congress enacted the 1968 Crime 
Control Bill aimed at overturning it.9  During the 1968 presidential 
campaign, Richard Nixon urged Congress to pass the bill, calling Miranda a 
“legal technicalit[y]” that had “very nearly rule[d] out the ‘confession’ as an 
effective . . . tool in . . . law enforcement.”10  Twenty years later, the 
Reagan Justice Department, under Attorney General Edwin Meese, 
described the Miranda ruling as “a derelict on the waters of the law,” and 
proclaimed that “[o]verturning Miranda would . . . be among the most 
important achievements of this administration . . . in restoring the power of 
self-government to the people . . . in the suppression of crime.”11
But when the 1968 legislation ultimately reached the Supreme Court in 
2000 in Dickerson v. United States, Chief Justice Rehnquist, a longtime 
critic of Miranda, surprised many Court-watchers by writing the majority 
 
 
6 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century 
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 12 (1995) (noting that “the Court was barely able to go as far 
as it did,” and “at the time it was probably not possible to persuade a majority of the Court to 
go one inch further”); George C. Thomas III, “Truth Machines” and Confessions Law in the 
Year 2046, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 215, 218 (2007) (maintaining that “Miranda was not a 
revolution” but instead “a compromise, a quintessentially mid-60s compromise”). 
7 See, e.g., FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 
1 (2d ed. 1967) (commenting, one year after Miranda, that “all but a very few of the 
interrogation tactics and techniques presented in our earlier publication are still valid if used 
after the recently prescribed warnings have been given to the suspect . . . , and after he has 
waived his self-incrimination privilege and his right to counsel”). 
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) (“This does not mean . . . that each 
police station must have a ‘station house lawyer’ present at all times to advise prisoners.”); 
cf. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 22–25, Miranda, 384 
U.S. 436 (Nos. 759-761, 584) (urging the Court to ban interrogations absent the presence of 
counsel); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to 
Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1830 (1987) (proposing that police be 
prohibited from questioning suspects who have not consulted with a lawyer). 
9 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006) (providing that confessions are admissible in federal court so 
long as they are “voluntarily made,” taking into account “all the circumstances surrounding 
the giving of the confession”); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 436, 442 
(2000) (concluding that “Congress intended by its enactment to overrule Miranda” by 
“reinstat[ing]” the voluntariness due process test that Miranda sought to replace).  See 
generally Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress “Overrule” Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
883 (2000). 
10 RICHARD M. NIXON, TOWARD FREEDOM FROM FEAR, reprinted in 114 CONG. REC. 
12,936–39 (1968). 
11 OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437, 
565 (1989). 
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opinion striking the statute down.12  Despite language in prior Supreme 
Court decisions referring to Miranda warnings as “prophylactic” rules, 
“procedural safeguards associated with” the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, and “not themselves rights protected by the 
Constitution,”13 the seven Justices in the Dickerson majority concluded that 
Miranda was “a constitutional decision” that “may not be in effect 
overruled by an Act of Congress.”14  The Court did not go so far as to 
wholeheartedly embrace the Warren Court’s decision, cautioning that 
“[w]hether or not we would agree with Miranda’s reasoning and its 
resulting rule . . . in the first instance, . . . Miranda has become embedded in 
routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of 
our national culture.”15  Thus, Dickerson “froze in place the status quo,”16 
even though in so doing it did not create a particularly tidy jurisprudential 
package.17
Three years later, in Missouri v. Seibert, a plurality of the Court 
likewise invalidated the “question-first” interrogation technique, a “practice 
 
 
12 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 430.  As an Associate Justice, Rehnquist was the author of the 
plurality opinion in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974), which first described the 
Miranda rights as “prophylactic rules.”  For theories attempting to explain Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s vote in Dickerson, see Kamisar, supra note 4, at 199–201. 
13 Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (“[T]he 
Miranda exclusionary rule . . . sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself [and] 
may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.”); New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (referring to Miranda warnings as “procedural safeguards 
associated with the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination” that “provide[] 
‘practical reinforcement’ for the Fifth Amendment right”) (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444). 
14 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.  The Court “concede[d],” however, that “language in 
some of our opinions . . . support[ed] the view taken by” the Fourth Circuit in upholding the 
federal statute.  Id. at 438. 
15 Id. at 443. 
16 Klein, supra note 5, at 1077. 
17 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in 
Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 898, 900 (2001) (noting that his initial response to the 
Court’s decision was to wonder, “Where’s the rest of the opinion?” and concluding that “this 
result-oriented ‘success’ came at the great cost of any pretense of consistency in the Court’s 
doctrine”); R. Ted Cruz, In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARV. L. REV. 10, 15 
(2005) (observing that the Court’s reasoning was not “the tightest of logical syllogisms,” and 
describing the decision as saying, “[f]irst, Miranda is NOT required by the Constitution” but 
is “merely prophylactic”; “[s]econd, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 is not good law”; and “[t]hird, do not 
ask why, and please, never, ever, ever cite this opinion for any reason”); Donald A. Dripps, 
Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing 
Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (pointing out that 
Dickerson was a “compromise opinion, intentionally written to say less rather than more, for 
the sake of achieving a strong majority on the narrow question of Miranda’s continued 
vitality”).  For further discussion of Dickerson, see infra notes 370–73 and accompanying 
text.  
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of some popularity” that had been “promoted” in certain police 
departments.18  Police using this tactic made a “‘conscious decision’” to 
start interrogating a suspect without first reading Miranda warnings.19  
Then later, after they elicited a statement that was concededly inadmissible 
(because of the Miranda violation), they would belatedly provide Miranda 
warnings, secure a waiver, and “cover the same ground a second time” 
“‘until [they got] the answer that [the suspect] already provided once.’”20 
Calling question-first interrogation “a police strategy adapted to undermine 
the Miranda warnings,” the plurality refused to allow the prosecution to 
introduce the second statement Seibert made following the administration 
of Miranda.21
Despite cases like Seibert, the police have generally made their peace 
with Miranda, and so seemingly has the Court.  In large measure, law 
enforcement has successfully “adapted” to the Warren Court’s decision.  
For example, police officers regularly “de-emphasize the significance” of 
the Miranda warnings in various ways: reading them in a “perfunctory” or 
“bureaucratic” tone of voice, suggesting they are “a mere formality . . . to 
dispense with prior to questioning”; “undermining the . . . warnings’ effect” 
by “focusing the suspect’s attention on the importance of telling his story”; 
or “treat[ing] the suspect’s waiver of the warnings as a fait accompli.”
 
22  
Whether because of these tactics, or because the warnings themselves are 
simply unable to dispel the inherent coerciveness of interrogation,23
 
18 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609–10 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 the 
overwhelming majority of suspects waive their rights and agree to talk to 
19 Id. at 605–06 (quoting police officer’s suppression hearing testimony). 
20 Id. at 604–06 (quoting police officer’s suppression hearing testimony). 
21 Id. at 615–16.  Seibert was initially questioned without warnings for about half an hour 
and then, after she made an incriminating statement and was given a break, the police 
“turned on a tape recorder, gave [her] the Miranda warnings, and obtained a signed waiver 
of rights from her.”  Id. at 605.  But cf. Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling 
(with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 21 (2010) (arguing that 
“the fractured opinions [in Seibert] in effect instructed police on how to ignore Miranda”).  
For further discussion of Seibert, see infra notes 366–69 and accompanying text. 
22 Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators’ 
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 433–37 
(1999).  But cf. Kamisar, supra note 4, at 186 (arguing that “‘circumventing,’ ‘evading,’ or 
‘disregarding’” are “more accurate” terms than “‘adapting’ or ‘adjusting’”). 
23 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (“But if 
the defendant may not answer without a warning . . . without having his answer be a 
compelled one, how can the Court ever accept his negative answer to the question of whether 
he wants to consult . . . counsel . . . ?”); Ogletree, supra note 8, at 1838 (criticizing the 
Miranda Court for “assum[ing] that the simple act of having the interrogator read the 
warnings to the suspect could offset the coercive atmosphere sufficiently” for a valid 
waiver). 
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the police without the assistance of counsel.24  Thus, Miranda ultimately led 
to “an equilibrium that both police officers and courts, the regulated and the 
regulators, were willing to live with.”25  The Court’s pragmatic approach to 
Miranda has maintained that equilibrium, such that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
was able to announce in Dickerson that “subsequent cases have reduced the 
impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming 
the decision’s core ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as 
evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief.”26
Against this backdrop, the first clues as to the Roberts Court’s views 
on Miranda came last Term.  The Court jumped right in, granting cert in 
three cases—Maryland v. Shatzer,
 
27 Florida v. Powell,28 and Berghuis v. 
Thompkins29
Part II of the Article begins with Maryland v. Shatzer, which cut back 
on Miranda in two respects: first, the Court created a break-in-custody 
exception to the Edwards rule that protects suspects who invoke their 
rights,
—that together raised questions spanning the range of issues 
that arise under Miranda.  On each occasion, the Government prevailed.  In 
fact, the three cases involved eight separate Miranda issues, each of them 
resolved in favor of the prosecution.  This Article uses these opinions as the 
vehicle to test the Roberts Court’s commitment to the pragmatic approach 
to Miranda.  In examining the cases through a pragmatic lens, I evaluate 
them on several levels: whether they make only incremental changes in the 
law or tread new ground, both in terms of Supreme Court precedent and the 
trend among the lower courts; whether the Court can justify its ruling on 
pragmatic grounds or instead leaves the door open to law enforcement 
efforts to circumvent Miranda; and whether the opinions are one-sided or 
sensitive to the concerns of suspects facing custodial interrogation. 
30
 
24 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Irrelevance: Questioning the Relevance of 
Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1009 (2001) (citing studies 
finding that about 80% of suspects waive their rights); George C. Thomas III, Stories About 
Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1976 (2004) (reporting similar figures, and noting that 
“[m]ore than 10 times as many suspects waived Miranda as invoked” their rights). 
 and second, it ruled that inmates serving prison sentences are not in 
25 William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 999 (2001); see also, 
e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND 
ACCOUNT 45 (1991) (observing that law enforcement officials “learned to live with Miranda, 
and even to love it, to the extent that it provided them with a safe harbor”); Leo, supra note 
24, at 1021, 1027 (commenting that “police have transformed Miranda into a tool of law 
enforcement” such that “Miranda has now become a standard part of the machine”). 
26 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443–44 (2000). 
27 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010). 
28 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010). 
29 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
30 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219–24.  
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“custody” for purposes of Miranda.31  Despite ruling against Shatzer on 
both issues and extending Supreme Court precedent in defining custody, the 
majority opinion was consistent with a pragmatic approach to Miranda and 
somewhat sensitive to the policies underlying that decision.  In fact, it 
contained language protective of suspects’ rights on other questions the 
Court had not clearly resolved on prior occasions.32
In Florida v. Powell, which is the focus of Part III, the Court upheld a 
variation on the Miranda warnings given to the suspect there, rejecting his 
argument that the police did not adequately inform him of the right to have 
an attorney with him in the interrogation room.
 
33
In the final case, Berghuis v. Thompkins, which is analyzed in Part IV, 
the Court resolved four issues directly and a fifth implicitly, all in favor of 
the prosecution.  Two of the rulings—that suspects must unequivocally 
invoke the right to silence and that this clear invocation requirement applies 
even where a suspect did not initially agree to waive her rights—endorsed 
the prevailing lower court view and therefore may have been expected, even 
though they are difficult to reconcile with a pragmatic approach.
  Although the opinion was 
tied to the narrow facts of the case, it departed from both the Court’s own 
precedent and lower court case law and is harder to defend on pragmatic 
grounds. 
34  But the 
more significant holdings—that Thompkins did not successfully invoke his 
right to silence by remaining silent, that he impliedly waived Miranda by 
giving a one-word answer to a question almost three hours into the 
interrogation,35 and that the police do not have to secure a Miranda waiver 
prior to initiating interrogation36
Thus, I conclude that while Shatzer and Powell arguably effect only 
piecemeal changes in the law, poking holes in Miranda without giving the 
police substantial room to undermine it, Thompkins is a different story.  The 
combined impact of the rulings in Thompkins enables the police to 
administer Miranda warnings in a very quick, dismissive, bureaucratic way 
and then launch immediately into the interrogation—unless and until the 
suspect has the wherewithal to unequivocally invoke her rights.  In so 
holding, Thompkins deviates dramatically from Supreme Court precedent 
and goes a long way towards undoing Miranda and reinstating the 
voluntariness due process test Miranda sought to replace. 
—cannot be justified on pragmatic grounds. 
 
31 Id. at 1224–25. 
32 Id. 
33 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204–06. 
34 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2259–60. 
35 Id. at 2262–63. 
36 Id. at 2263–64. 
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To the extent Thompkins signals a change in the Court’s attitude 
toward Miranda, it comes at a particularly critical time given recent 
suggestions that Congress create an exception to Miranda for terrorism 
suspects.  While Dickerson may indicate that the Court would not look 
favorably on such legislation, Thompkins may change that calculus.  Some 
preliminary thoughts on the implications of the Roberts Court’s rulings for 
a terrorism exception to Miranda appear in the final piece of the Article. 
II. MARYLAND V. SHATZER 
In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court created a break-in-custody exception 
to Edwards v. Arizona, holding that a defendant who is released from 
custody for a period of at least fourteen days loses the protection Edwards 
provides to suspects who invoke the right to counsel.37  The Shatzer Court 
also decided that a prisoner “subject to a baseline set of restraints imposed 
pursuant to a prior conviction” is not in custody for Miranda purposes.38
A. THE BREAK-IN-CUSTODY EXCEPTION 
  
Although the Court’s discussion of custody departed somewhat from 
Supreme Court precedent, neither ruling deviated from the trend in the 
lower court case law or a pragmatic approach to Miranda.  Moreover, both 
portions of the Court’s opinion showed some sensitivity to the interests of 
criminal defendants and the policy goals underlying Miranda. 
When Shatzer was initially questioned in connection with suspicions 
that he had sexually abused his son, he invoked the Miranda right to 
counsel.  Consistent with the Court’s holding in Edwards v. Arizona that a 
suspect who asserts the right to counsel “is not subject to further 
interrogation . . . until counsel has been made available to him,”39
 
37 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1213 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 47 (1981)). 
 the 
interview ended.  At the time, Shatzer was serving a prison term for an 
unrelated sexual offense involving a different child.  He was returned to the 
general prison population for more than two and a half years until the police 
uncovered further evidence implicating him in the abuse of his son.  At that 
point, a different officer returned to the prison and questioned Shatzer in a 
38 Id. at 1224. 
39 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85.  The Edwards rule was extended in Arizona v. 
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), to apply even to good faith violations and also to prohibit 
the police from asking the suspect even about a different crime.  It was then extended still 
further in Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), to bar interrogation of a suspect who 
requested counsel unless the attorney was present in the room, even if the suspect had 
already been given an opportunity to consult with her. 
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prison maintenance room.  Prior to this second interrogation, Shatzer 
received Miranda warnings and executed a written waiver.40
In recognizing a break-in-custody exception to Edwards and therefore 
finding that Shatzer’s Miranda rights had not been violated, Justice Scalia’s 
opinion for the majority reasoned that a suspect who has “returned to his 
normal life” between interrogation sessions does not remain “isolated” in a 
police-dominated setting and “has likely been able to seek advice” from 
others.
 
41  As a result, the Court believed there was “little reason to think” 
that Shatzer’s “change of heart” was the result of police coercion, as 
opposed to a decision on his part that “cooperating with the investigation 
[was] in his interest.”42  Turning next to the question when a break in 
custody is “of sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive effects,” the Court 
concluded that law enforcement’s need for “certainty” made it “impractical 
to leave the answer to . . . future case-by-case adjudication” and drew the 
line at fourteen days.43  “It seems to us,” the Court opined, that two weeks 
“provides plenty of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal 
life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual 
coercive effects of his prior custody.”44
Although Shatzer therefore cut back on the protections afforded 
criminal defendants by Miranda and Edwards, the Court spoke largely in 
one voice.  None of the Justices would have suppressed Shatzer’s 
confession, although Justice Stevens would have required a break in 
 
 
40 See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217–18. 
41 Id. at 1221. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1222–23. 
44 Id. at 1228.  But cf. id. at 1231 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (pointing out 
that the majority provided “no reason for that speculation”); id. at 1228 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (calling the majority’s line “arbitrary”).  
The record does not indicate precisely how the Court arrived at the fourteen-day limit.  
Although the State of Maryland’s initial brief took the view that the Edwards protective 
shield should disappear as soon as a suspect is released from custody, see Brief for Petitioner 
at 21, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (No. 08-680) (defending this position because it “establishes 
a bright-line rule”), its reply brief suggested that the Court “properly may draw the line at the 
point where badgering is unlikely to have occurred, be it the three days that were at issue in 
Roberson and Minnick, three weeks, or the thirty days suggested by Amicus Curiae, 
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.”  Reply Brief for Petitioner at 10, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 
1213 (No. 08-680).  As the State noted, one amicus brief proposed a thirty-day limit on the 
grounds that “[a]n interrogation that took place 30 days ago is still fresh in the interrogator’s 
and the defendant’s minds, . . . it is less likely that a new officer will be assigned to the same 
investigation[, and] records are less likely to be misplaced.”  Brief Amicus Curiae of the 
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 19, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 
(No. 08-680).  At oral argument, the State then suggested a seven-day limit.  See Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 15, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (No. 08-680).  Until the Court issued its 
opinion, then, there seems to have been no mention of a fourteen-day cutoff. 
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custody longer than fourteen days before “treating the second interrogation 
as no more coercive than the first.”45  Justice Stevens was unwilling to 
specify a fixed line, but he thought “a significant period of time”46 was 
needed to trigger a break-in-custody exception because a suspect who 
invokes the right to counsel and then never sees the attorney he requested is 
“likely to feel that the police lied to him or are ignoring his rights,”47 and 
therefore that “‘further objection [is] futile and confession [is] the only way 
to end his interrogation.’”48
Not only was the Shatzer decision virtually unanimous, but it also 
effected only an incremental change in the law.  The break-in-custody 
exception had been widely endorsed by the lower courts
 
49 and 
foreshadowed in some of the Supreme Court’s own precedents.  Although 
the Court had never directly addressed the question50
 
45 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1234 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 and some of its 
opinions “could be read to suggest that the Edwards presumption, once 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 1234 n.15. 
48 Id. at 1229 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 473 (1994) (Souter, J., 
concurring in the judgment)); cf. Marcy Strauss, Reinterrogation, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
359, 401–02 (1995) (suggesting six months because a suspect whose “rights [are] respected 
for six months . . . will likely not believe she is a victim of police badgering,” it is “highly 
unlikely that the police will release a suspect for the sole purpose of breaking Edwards if 
they must wait six months” before interrogating her, and half a year is “a significant enough 
interval that at least it can be argued that some individuals might feel differently about 
dealing with authority”). 
49 See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220 (noting that “[l]ower courts have uniformly held that a 
break in custody ends the Edwards presumption”); Eugene L. Shapiro, Thinking the 
Unthinkable: Recasting the Presumption of Edwards v. Arizona, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 11, 23 & 
nn.90–91 (2000); Strauss, supra note 48, at 386. 
50 More than fifteen years ago, the Court agreed to consider whether a defendant was still 
entitled to the protection of Edwards even though five months had elapsed and he had 
already pleaded guilty to the charge for which he requested counsel.  The Court heard oral 
argument in the case but then dismissed the cert petition when the prisoner died.  See United 
States v. Green, 507 U.S. 545 (1993). 
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triggered, lasts forever,”51 language in other decisions implied that the 
Edwards protection applied only if the suspect was “still in custody.”52
In addition to working only a piecemeal change in the law, the Shatzer 
decision was consistent with a pragmatic approach to Miranda.  The Court 
reasoned that a break in custody was the “only logical endpoint” to 
Edwards; otherwise, the Court feared, the Edwards ban on police 
interrogation would essentially become “eternal.”
 
53  Given the Court’s 
holdings in Arizona v. Roberson—that Edwards applies even when the 
police wish to interrogate a suspect about a crime other than the one for 
which she requested counsel and even in cases of inadvertent violations 
(when the interrogating officer has no idea the suspect previously asserted 
the right to counsel)54—the Shatzer Court thought that law enforcement 
officials would be severely hamstrung without a break-in-custody 
exception.  “In a country that harbors a large number of repeat offenders,” 
the Court concluded, “this consequence is disastrous.”55
At the same time, the Court was sensitive to Shatzer’s objection that 
the position taken in a separate opinion written by Justice Thomas—that 





51 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Shatzer, 130 
S. Ct. 1213 (No. 08-680) (citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990); Arizona 
v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680–82 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 
(1981)). 
—was easily subject to police manipulation.  Justice Thomas’s 
approach would allow law enforcement officials to engage in catch-and-
release tactics, repeatedly arresting a suspect, releasing her if she invoked 
52 Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683 (“As a matter of law, the presumption raised by a suspect’s 
request for counsel . . . does not disappear simply because the police have approached the 
suspect, still in custody, still without counsel, about a separate investigation.”); see also 
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991) (observing in dicta that a “suspect’s 
statements are presumed involuntary” under Edwards “assuming there has been no break in 
custody”); Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (“[I]t is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for 
the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly 
asserted his right to counsel.”). 
53 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222.  The Court declined to address the State’s alternative 
suggestion that a “substantial lapse in time” in and of itself terminates a suspect’s protection 
under Edwards.  See id. at 1222 n.4. 
54 Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682–85, 687 (“attach[ing] no significance” to the officer’s good 
faith because “Edwards focuses on the state of mind of the suspect and not of the police” and 
police “procedures . . . must enable an officer who proposes to initiate an interrogation to 
determine whether the suspect has previously requested counsel”). 
55 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222. 
56 See id. at 1227–28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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her Miranda rights, and then promptly re-arresting her.57  The fourteen-day 
window was designed, the majority said, to avoid such “police abuse.”58
Even though the Court’s decision to support a break-in-custody 
exception was consistent with a pragmatic approach to Miranda, there is 
much to be said for the contrary view.  During the initial interrogation 
session, Shatzer was advised of his right to counsel and requested an 
attorney, but he never actually got what he wanted.
 
59  More important, once 
a suspect is released from custody, she is not entitled to state-provided 
counsel (assuming charges have not yet been filed).60  For those unable to 
afford private lawyers, then, a fourteen-day break in custody does not 
provide a meaningful opportunity to obtain legal advice.  As the Court 
noted in Arizona v. Roberson, “to a suspect who has indicated his inability 
to cope with the pressures of custodial interrogation by requesting counsel, 
any further interrogation without counsel having been provided will surely 
exacerbate whatever compulsion to speak the suspect may be feeling.”61
Although the Court obviously did not see it this way and its opinion 
contained rhetoric belittling some of its precedents, the Shatzer decision 
was not completely one-sided.  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion did refer 
snidely to Edwards as a “super-prophylactic rule,”
 
62 and also spoke of 
“genuinely coerced” confessions63
 
57 Cf. State v. Alley, 841 A.2d 803, 809–10 (Me. 2004) (finding that suspect had “a 
reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney” even though he was released at 2:35 p.m. and 
had only a six-hour break in custody). 
—as contrasted with the merely 
58 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223. 
59 Cf. Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary 
Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 797, 804 (2006) (arguing that the “Miranda 
right to counsel is in reality an empty promise” given that “[f]orty years of experience” has 
shown that in “the vast majority” of cases where a suspect asserts the right to counsel, “no 
attorney is provided”). 
60 Miranda and its right to counsel do not protect one who is no longer in custody, see 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966), and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is 
not triggered until “adversary judicial proceedings” have begun.  Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682, 688–89 (1972) (requiring a “formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, 
information, or arraignment”). 
61 Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 686 (1988); see also Strauss, supra note 48, at 392 
(arguing that a break in custody is “unrelated to the notion of voluntariness in the sense of 
implementing the suspect’s choice to deal with the authorities only through counsel”). 
62 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1221 n.3; see also id. at 1219, 1220 (calling Edwards a “‘second 
layer of prophylaxis’” as opposed to “a constitutional mandate”) (quoting McNeil v. 
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991)). 
63 Id. at 1221; see also id. at 1222 (referring to “in-fact voluntary confessions”). 
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presumptively coerced confessions violative of Miranda.64  Additionally, 
the Court subjected Edwards to the seemingly omnipresent balancing test 
applied the previous Term in a Sixth Amendment confession case,65 
warning of the costs occasioned by Edwards in terms of “voluntary 
confessions it excludes from trial” and cautioning that “[t]he Edwards 
presumption of involuntariness is justified only in circumstances where . . . 
suspects’ waivers of Miranda rights are likely to be involuntary most of the 
time.”66
On the other hand, the Court made the significant announcement that 
once a suspect asserts the right to counsel, Edwards prevents the police 
even from inquiring whether she has changed her mind and is now willing 
to talk to them without a lawyer.  Language in prior Supreme Court 
 
 
64 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985) (“A Miranda violation does not 
constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring 
suppression of all unwarned statements.”); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654–55 & 
n.5 (1984) (distinguishing confessions that are “actually compelled” from those that are 
“presumed compelled because of [the] failure to read . . . Miranda warnings”). 
65 See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009) (“When this Court creates a 
prophylactic rule in order to protect a constitutional right, the relevant ‘reasoning’ is the 
weighing of the rule’s benefits against its costs.”). 
66 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222, 1226 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1220 (observing 
that “[a] judicially crafted rule is ‘justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose,’ 
and applies only where its benefits outweigh its costs”) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 
U.S. 452, 458 (1994)); id. at 1221 (noting that “[t]he ‘justification for a conclusive 
presumption disappears when application of the presumption will not reach the correct result 
most of the time’”) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 (1991)).  These cases 
thus import into the confessions arena the same “freewheeling” balancing approach 
prevalent in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Carol S. Steiker, Second 
Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 855 (1994); see also, e.g., Anthony 
G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 393–94 
(1974) (criticizing the “sliding scale approach” because it “converts” the law into “one 
immense Rorschach blot,” which can “only produce more slide than scale [and] means in 
practice . . . that appellate courts defer to trial courts and trial courts defer to the police”).  
For the view that the Fourth Amendment’s balancing test has no place in interpreting the 
Fifth Amendment’s absolute prohibition of compelled self-incrimination, see, for example, 
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 687–88 & n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Geoffrey R. Stone, The 
Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 S. CT. REV. 99, 110–11; Charles D. 
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 170–73 (1998). 
388 KIT KINPORTS [Vol. 101 
opinions had fluctuated between that position67 and the more prosecution-
friendly view that Edwards only prohibits the police from engaging in 
conduct that rises to the level of “interrogation” for purposes of Miranda.68  
Resolving the divisions that these conflicting signals had generated in the 
lower courts, the Shatzer majority observed that Edwards bars even 
“subsequent requests for interrogation.”69  Otherwise, the Court pointed out, 
police officers will be able to “take advantage of the mounting coercive 
pressures of ‘prolonged police custody’”70 by making multiple attempts to 
question a suspect who invoked the right to counsel until she is “‘badgered 
into submission.’”71  Later in the opinion, the Court likewise described 
Edwards as “prevent[ing] any efforts to get [the suspect] to change his 
mind.”72
 
67 See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090 (summarizing Edwards as providing that once a 
suspect asserts the right to counsel, “not only must the immediate contact end, but 
‘badgering’ by later requests is prohibited”); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176–77 
(1991) (observing that a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel “may not be 
approached for further interrogation” and the police may not “subsequently initiate an 
encounter in the absence of counsel”); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) 
(noting that “any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the 
suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ and 
not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect”) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
467 (1966)). 
  Lest there be any doubt, the Court then criticized Justice 
Stevens’s concurrence for speaking in terms of “‘reinterrogat[ing]’” a 
suspect: the “fallacy” of Justice Stevens’s argument, the majority noted, “is 
that we are not talking about ‘reinterrogating’ the suspect; we are talking 
68 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (holding that a suspect who 
invokes counsel “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has 
been made available to him”); see also Roberson, 486 U.S. at 686 (“[T]o a suspect who has 
indicated his inability to cope with the pressures of custodial interrogation by requesting 
counsel, any further interrogation without counsel having been provided will surely 
exacerbate whatever compulsion to speak the suspect may be feeling.”); Smith v. Illinois, 
469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam) (observing that “Edwards set forth a ‘bright-line rule’ 
that all questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel”) (quoting Solem v. 
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646–47 (1984)); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983) 
(plurality opinion) (discussing the steps police must take “before a suspect in custody can be 
subjected to further interrogation after he requests an attorney”). 
69 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220.  See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, 
NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.9(f), at 845–47 (3d ed. 2007) 
(citing conflicting lower court rulings on this issue). 
70 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220 (quoting Roberson, 486 U.S. at 686). 
71 Id. (quoting Roberson, 486 U.S. at 690 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
72 Id. at 1225 n.8; see also id. at 1221 (noting that after a break in custody, “it is far 
fetched to think that a police officer’s asking the suspect whether he would like to waive his 
Miranda rights will any more ‘wear down the accused’ than did the first such request”) 
(quoting Smith, 469 U.S. at 98) (emphasis added). 
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about asking his permission to be interrogated.”73  This is clearly a broader 
reading of the Edwards line of cases than the view that police do not violate 
the Miranda rights of a suspect who has asserted the right to counsel unless 
their conduct constitutes “interrogation” as defined in Rhode Island v. 
Innis.74
Thus, the Court’s decision to endorse a break-in-custody exception to 
Edwards did not make a fundamental change in the law and was defensible 
on pragmatic grounds.  Moreover, the opinion was somewhat balanced, 
even though it did seem to pull an unduly abbreviated fourteen-day cutoff 
out of thin air. 
 
B. PRISONERS IN CUSTODY 
After determining that Edwards’s protective umbrella closes after a 
break in custody of at least fourteen days, the Court went on to determine 
that Shatzer in fact enjoyed such a break from custody when, after the first 
interrogation session ended with his assertion of the right to counsel, he was 
“released back into the general prison population where he was serving an 
unrelated sentence.”75  In so holding, the Court reasoned that inmates like 
Shatzer “live in prison” and “return to their accustomed surroundings and 
daily routine” rather than remaining “isolated with their accusers.”76  
Although Justice Scalia’s majority opinion stressed that it was not 
“minimizing the harsh realities of incarceration,” it pointed out that 
prisoners who rejoin the general prison population “regain the degree of 
control they had over their lives prior to the interrogation,” including, in 
Shatzer’s case, access to a prison library, mail, recreation, educational and 
training programs, and visitors.77  Finally, the Court explained that, unlike a 
suspect in “interrogative custody,” the restrictions on Shatzer’s freedom did 
not “rest[] with those controlling the[] interrogation,” as his questioners had 
“no power to increase the duration of [his] incarceration.”78
 
73 Id. at 1225 (quoting Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1229 (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment)).  Likewise, at oral argument, Justice Scalia asked the State’s attorney: “I thought 
that you couldn’t approach him.  I thought that once he’s invoked his right to counsel, you 
can’t approach him and say, would you like to talk now?  Right?  Isn’t that . . . the rule?”  
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 
 
44, at 26. 
74 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980) (defining interrogation as “express 
questioning or its functional equivalent,” i.e., “any words or actions on the part of the 
police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response”). 
75 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1225 & n.8. 
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Although the Supreme Court’s conclusion coincided with that reached 
by numerous lower courts,79 the Court was somewhat disingenuous in 
discussing its own precedents and claiming that it had “explicitly declined 
to address” this question on prior occasions.80  In support of this 
proposition, the Court cited Illinois v. Perkins, which held that a suspect 
being questioned by an undercover informant is not entitled to Miranda 
warnings because the requisite “‘interplay’” between custody and 
interrogation is missing.81  Specifically, the Shatzer Court relied on a 
parenthetical in Perkins that came at the end of a paragraph discussing the 
Court’s prior decision in Mathis v. United States.82  In that parenthetical, the 
Perkins Court left open whether “the bare fact of custody” necessarily 
requires Miranda warnings “even when the suspect is aware that he is 
speaking to [a government] official.”83  But the Court did not deny that 
Perkins—who was imprisoned pending trial on another charge—was in 
custody for purposes of Miranda.  In fact, the Court acknowledged that he 
was “in custody in a technical sense,” but criticized the state court for 
“mistakenly assum[ing] that because [he] was in custody, no undercover 
questioning could take place.”84
Moreover, the Shatzer majority itself did not even cite Mathis, the 
Supreme Court precedent most on point.
 
85  In that case, the Court held that 
an inmate serving a state prison sentence was entitled to Miranda warnings 
during a jailhouse interview with an IRS agent conducting a tax fraud 
investigation.86  Although the finding that Mathis should have been read his 
Miranda rights signifies that he must have been in custody, the Court’s 
brief discussion focused on rejecting the Government’s argument that 
Mathis was not in custody because he had been put in prison by other law 
enforcement officials for a different offense.87
 
79 See Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody 
for Incarcerated Suspects, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 935–39 (1997). 
  Admittedly, the Court’s 
80 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224. 
81 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (quoting Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. 
Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What Is “Interrogation”? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 63 (1978)). 
82 Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). 
83 Perkins, 496 U.S. at 299, cited in Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224. 
84 Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added); see also id. at 300 n.* (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (noting that the case might well have come out differently if 
Perkins had previously asserted his right to counsel given that he was “in custody on an 
unrelated charge when he was questioned”). 
85 Only Justice Stevens’s separate opinion cited Mathis.  Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1232 n.12 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
86 See Mathis, 391 U.S. at 2–3. 
87 See id. at 5 (finding “the reason why the person is in custody” irrelevant for purposes 
of Miranda). 
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attention in Mathis was directed at the defendant’s status at the time he was 
being questioned (and the Court did not deny that Shatzer was in custody 
during both interviews).88  Furthermore, the majority of lower courts have 
interpreted Mathis as requiring “some restraint additional to those usually 
imposed upon [a suspect] as an inmate.”89  But in finding that Mathis was 
entitled to Miranda warnings, the Supreme Court did not rely on any 
particular “restraints” placed on him during the interview.  In fact, the 
Court’s decision did not describe the interrogation session at all; the only 
detail that can be gleaned from the opinion is that the same IRS agent 
questioned Mathis twice somewhere in the prison where he was serving his 
sentence.  Additionally, the Mathis majority obviously rejected the Shatzer-
like argument Justice White made in dissent—that Mathis was not in 
custody because he was in “familiar surroundings” and therefore was no 
different from an individual being questioned at home or in an IRS office.90
After citing the Perkins parenthetical (and ignoring Mathis), the 
Shatzer Court went on to acknowledge that “all forms of incarceration”
  
Therefore, despite the fact that Perkins gratuitously seemed to cast doubt on 
Mathis, there is at least some tension between the Court’s decision in the 
latter case and the result in Shatzer, which the Court made no effort to 
reconcile. 
91 
satisfy the definition of custody originally set out in California v. Beheler 
and Oregon v. Mathiason—which asks whether the suspect was subjected 
to “‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree 
associated with a formal arrest.”92  Nonetheless, the Shatzer Court 
continued, its precedents indicated that “the freedom-of-movement test 
identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda 
custody.”93  But the Court’s only support here was Berkemer v. McCarty, 
which held that a suspect is not in custody for purposes of Miranda simply 
because she has been subjected to a traffic or Terry stop.94
 
88 See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224. 
  Despite the 
89 Magid, supra note 79, at 942; cf. 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.6(b), at 724 
(calling this “‘a unique body of caselaw’”) (quoting State v. Conley, 574 N.W.2d 569, 573 
(N.D. 1998)). 
90 Mathis, 391 U.S. at 7 (White, J., dissenting). 
91 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224. 
92 California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 
U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). 
93 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224. 
94 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984). 
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linguistic similarities between the definitions of custody95 and Terry stops,96 
Berkemer explained that, while a stop constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
“seizure,” it does not rise to the level of Miranda custody because it usually 
does not last long and takes place in public rather than a police-dominated 
atmosphere.97
Although the Court’s determination that Shatzer was not in custody 
extended Supreme Court precedent, it was consistent with the Court’s 
pragmatic approach to Miranda.  A holding that inmates serving their 
sentences are perpetually in custody for purposes of Miranda would require 
prison guards to provide warnings before asking any incriminating 
questions, thus making prisoners permanently “question-proof.”
  Neither of these is a particularly apt description of 
incarceration, however, and therefore it is not obvious how Berkemer 
supported the Shatzer Court’s efforts to distinguish Beheler and Mathiason 
and thereby avoid the conclusion that Shatzer in fact was continuously in 
custody under the definition set out in those two cases. 
98  In the 
words of the Ninth Circuit, the result would be to “torture [Miranda] to the 
illogical position of providing greater protection to a prisoner than to his 
nonimprisoned counterpart.”99
Nevertheless, the Court could easily have defended a contrary 
conclusion.  Even the majority did not deny that, as Justice Stevens put it, 




95 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that warnings must be 
given to one who “has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way”); see also Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 (indicating that the 
definition of custody turns on the perspective of “a reasonable man in the suspect’s 
position”). 
  
Moreover, in explaining why Perkins was not entitled to Miranda warnings, 
the Court in that case expressed doubt that a prisoner being questioned by 
96 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (defining a stop as a 
situation where “‘a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave’”) 
(quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.)).  
Interestingly, the Court has used the Fourth Amendment “free to leave” language in 
explaining the concept of Miranda custody.  See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 659 
(2004); id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 669–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  For an 
analysis of Alvarado’s discussion of custody, see Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in 
Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71, 133–43 (2007). 
97 See Berkemer, 486 U.S. at 436–39. 
98 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 44, at 22. 
99 Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1978); see also United States v. 
Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985) (agreeing that a conclusion that prisoners are 
always in custody “would seriously disrupt prison administration” given the “myriad 
informal conversations between inmates and prison guards”). 
100 Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1232 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
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an undercover informant would “feel compelled to speak by the fear of 
reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of more lenient treatment should 
he confess.”101  Shatzer’s situation is readily distinguishable from Perkins, 
however.  Inmates serving prison terms are accustomed to receiving orders 
from government personnel and understand the consequences of disobeying 
them.  Additionally, even though the detectives who questioned Shatzer 
may have had “no apparent power to decrease the time served,”102 that does 
not mean that Shatzer’s cooperation (or lack thereof) would play no role in 
determining his eligibility for parole.103  Certainly, he might reasonably 
have feared that it could play such a role—an important consideration given 
that the definition of custody focuses on how a reasonable person “in the 
suspect’s position would have understood his situation.”104  And while the 
majority tried to distinguish Shatzer from the rest of the Edwards line of 
cases on the grounds that the latter group of defendants “confronted the 
uncertainties of what final charges they would face, whether they would be 
convicted, and what sentence they would receive,” Shatzer faced those 
same “uncertainties” with respect to the charges involving his son that were 
the subject of the two interrogations.105
Although the Court could therefore have justified a different outcome, 
Shatzer’s discussion of custody, like its break-in-custody holding, was not 
completely one-sided.  The Court acknowledged that Shatzer was in 
custody during both prison interviews, drawing a line between 
“interrogative custody” and “incarceration”
 
106 (or what some call 
“correctional custody”107).  While any other conclusion would have been 
difficult to reconcile with Mathis, inmates like Shatzer “live in prison,”108
 
101 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990); see also id. at 297 (“Questioning by 
captors, who appear to control the suspect’s fate, may create mutually reinforcing pressures 
that the Court has assumed will weaken the suspect’s will.”). 
 
102 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1225. 
103 See id. at 1233 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that “cooperation 
frequently is relevant to whether the prisoner can obtain parole,” and “even if . . . a 
prisoner’s fate is not controlled by the police who come to interrogate him, how is the 
prisoner supposed to know that?”); MD. CODE REGS tit. 12.08.01.18(A)(3) (2010) (taking 
into account “[t]he offender’s behavior and adjustment” as well as her “current attitude 
toward society, discipline, and other authority” in determining eligibility for parole). 
104 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (observing that this is “the only 
relevant inquiry”); see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004) (inquiring 
“‘how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge 
the breadth of his or her freedom of action’”) (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 
325 (1994) (per curiam)). 
105 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1225. 
106 Id. at 1225 n.8. 
107 United States v. Arrington, 215 F.3d 855, 856 (8th Cir. 2000). 
108 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224. 
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and typically interviews in one’s home are not custodial.109  Shatzer’s 
second interrogation, which took place in a prison maintenance room, lasted 
only about half an hour, the detective was not armed, and Shatzer was not 
placed in handcuffs.110  Nevertheless, the Court considered only the 
location and length of the meeting important enough even to mention and 
stated unequivocally that “a prisoner [who] is removed from the general 
prison population and taken to a separate location for questioning” is in 
custody.111
On balance, then, both rulings in Shatzer reflected some sensitivity to 
the interests Miranda was designed to protect.  Although the decision that 
prisoners are not continuously in custody constituted a more significant 
departure from Supreme Court precedent, neither that holding nor the 
break-in-custody exception deviated substantially from the lower court case 
law or the Court’s pragmatic approach to Miranda. 
 
III. FLORIDA V. POWELL 
In Florida v. Powell,112 decided the day before Shatzer, the Supreme 
Court found that Miranda’s requirement that suspects be “clearly informed” 
of the right to the presence of counsel “during interrogation”113
 
109 See 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 
 was 
satisfied even though Powell was never explicitly told that an attorney 
could be with him in the interrogation room.  Powell was arrested in 
Tampa, Florida, and pursuant to the standard Miranda waiver form used by 
that city’s police department, was first advised that he had “the right to talk 
to a lawyer before answering any of our questions” and that, if he could not 
69, § 6.6(e), at 738–40.  But cf. Orozco v. Texas, 
394 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1969) (finding that suspect who was questioned by four police 
officers in his bedroom at 4:00 a.m. was in custody). 
110 See Brief for the United States, supra note 51, at 2. 
111 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1225 n.8; see also id. at 1224 (noting that “[n]o one questions” 
this fact).  But cf. Magid, supra note 79, at 944 (reporting that many lower courts consider 
the following factors in determining whether a prison interview is custodial: “(1) the 
physical surroundings of the interrogation; (2) the language used to summon the inmate; (3) 
the extent to which he is confronted with evidence of his guilt; and (4) any additional 
pressure exerted to detain him such that there is a ‘restriction of his freedom over and above 
that in his normal prison setting’”) (quoting Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 
1978)).  See generally 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.6(c), at 729 (pointing out that 
custody determinations often depend on the totality of the circumstances). 
112 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010). 
113 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).  The Court has frequently reiterated 
that Miranda contemplates the right to the presence of counsel in the interrogation room.  
See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009) (“during interrogation”); Iowa 
v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 89 (2004) (“during questioning”); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 
452, 457 (1994) (“during questioning”); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 154 (1990) 
(“at custodial interrogation”). 
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afford an attorney, one would be appointed “before any questioning.”114  He 
was then told that he had “the right to use any of these rights at any time 
you want during this interview.”115
In concluding that this information “reasonably conveyed” Powell’s 
right to have counsel present during interrogation, Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion for the Court acknowledged that the warnings given Powell were 
“not the clearest possible formulation,” but nevertheless concluded that they 
were “sufficiently comprehensive and comprehensible when given a 
commonsense reading.”
 
116  The majority reasoned that “[t]he first statement 
communicated that Powell could consult with a lawyer before answering 
any particular question, and the second statement confirmed that he could 
exercise that right while the interrogation was underway.”117  “In 
combination,” the Court explained, “the two warnings reasonably conveyed 
Powell’s right to have an attorney present, not only at the outset of 
interrogation, but at all times.”118
Like Shatzer, the Court’s decision here was not particularly divisive: 
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion was joined only by Justice Breyer.  The 
dissenters disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the warnings given 
to Powell, taking the position that “[a]n intelligent suspect could reasonably 
conclude” he was entitled only to “a one-time right to consult with an 
attorney” rather than a right to have the lawyer “present with him in the 
interrogation room at all times.”
 
119
Although the Court was not deeply split, Powell effected a more 
dramatic change in the law than Shatzer.  The Powell majority did not 
mention the lower courts’ treatment of this issue, but in fact it had 
generated more of a conflict than either of the questions before the Court in 
Shatzer.  Some courts took the position that suspects must expressly be told 
that the right to counsel extends to the interrogation room, and even those 
that adopted a contrary view typically approved warnings that spoke 
generally about the “right to counsel” without suggesting any limitation or 
making any reference to timing.  Only a handful of courts had upheld 
 
 
114 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200 (emphasis added). 
115 Id. (emphasis added).  The complete waiver form read as follows: “You have the right 
to remain silent.  If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used 
against you in court.  You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our 
questions.  If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost 
and before any questioning.  You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you 
want during this interview.”  Id. 
116 Id. at 1205 (emphasis omitted). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 1212 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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warnings like the one given Powell that could be interpreted as applying 
only before interrogation.120
Powell may not have referenced the current state of the lower court 
case law, but the Court did discuss in detail its own precedent, claiming that 
California v. Prysock
 
121 and Duckworth v. Eagan122 “inform our judgment 
here.”123  In each of those prior cases, the Powell majority explained, the 
Court had refused to “dictate[] the words” police use in communicating 
Miranda warnings.124  Moreover, those were the two opinions in which 
Miranda’s requirement that suspects must be “clearly informed”125 of their 
rights was first interpreted (in Prysock) to mean “fully conveyed,”126 and 
then later (in Duckworth) was amended to the less rigorous “reasonably 
‘convey’” standard127 ultimately applied in Powell.128
The Powell opinion did not tread new ground, then, in terms of the 
legal standard it applied.  Nevertheless, as the Court acknowledged, the 
suspects in each of the earlier cases were expressly advised of their right to 
have an attorney present during interrogation,
 
129 and both opinions made 
clear that the suspects were entitled to that information.130
 
120 See id. at 1211–12; Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 18–21, Florida v. Powell, 130 
S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175); Brief for Respondent at 28–37, Florida v. Powell, 130 S. 
Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175); Adam S. Bazelon, Comment, Adding (or Reaffirming) a 
Temporal Element to the Miranda Warning “You Have the Right to an Attorney,” 90 MARQ. 
L. REV. 1009, 1019–20 (2007); Daria K. Boxer, Comment, Miranda with Precision: Why the 
Current Circuit Split Should Be Solved in Favor of a Uniform Requirement of an Explicit 
Miranda Warning of the Right to Have Counsel Present During Interrogation, 37 SW. U. L. 
REV. 425, 432–36 (2008). 
  The challenges 
121 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam). 
122 492 U.S. 195 (1989). 
123 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204. 
124 Id.; see also Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 202 (“We have never insisted that Miranda 
warnings be given in the exact form described in that decision.”); Prysock, 453 U.S. at 359 
(noting that Miranda “indicated that no talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its 
strictures”). 
125 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966). 
126 Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361. 
127 Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203 (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361); see also Jeff L’Hote, 
Note, Duckworth v. Eagan: A Semantical Debate or the Continuing Debasement of 
Miranda?, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1267, 1290 n.186 (1990) (pointing out that Duckworth 
“cavalierly substitutes the word ‘reasonably’ for the Prysock Court’s ‘fully’”). 
128 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204. 
129 See id. (citing Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198; Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356–57). 
130 See Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 204 (noting that Miranda mandates that “the suspect be 
informed, as here, that he has the right to an attorney before and during questioning”); 
Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361 (observing that “‘[this] is not a case in which the defendant was not 
informed of his right to the presence of an attorney during questioning . . . or in which the 
offer of an appointed attorney was associated with a future time in court’”) (quoting United 
States v. Noa, 443 F.2d 144, 146 (9th Cir. 1971)). 
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in those two cases were instead linked to additional information provided 
by the police during the administration of Miranda warnings. 
In Prysock, for example, the suspect was informed of his right to “talk 
to a lawyer before you are questioned” and to have the attorney “present 
with you while you are being questioned, and all during the questioning.”131  
In addition, he was advised that he had “the right to have a lawyer 
appointed to represent you at no cost to yourself.”132  As the Powell Court 
rightly pointed out, the Prysock opinion was critical of the California Court 
of Appeal for also requiring “an express statement that the appointment of 
an attorney would occur prior to the impending interrogation.”133  But that 
language does not necessarily indicate that the Prysock Court would have 
approved the version of the warnings given in Powell.  First, despite that 
criticism, most of the Prysock Court’s attention was focused elsewhere.  
Much of the Prysock opinion was devoted to correcting a more basic 
misstep the state appellate court made by “essentially la[ying] down a flat 
rule” mandating that Miranda warnings must be “a virtual incantation of the 
precise language contained in the Miranda opinion.”134
Second, Powell’s complaint involved a more fundamental error.  
Prysock, unlike Powell, was explicitly told not only that he could consult a 
lawyer prior to interrogation but also that he had the right to have the 
attorney accompany him into the interrogation room.  Furthermore, the 
basis of the California court’s determination that Prysock had not been 
adequately informed of his right to appointed counsel was “simply . . . the 
order in which [the warnings] were given”
 
135—the police had made a 
“‘needless excursion’” between describing the right to counsel and the right 
to appointed counsel into a discussion of Prysock’s right to have his parents 
present during the interrogation.136
 
131 Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added). 
  Thus, the Supreme Court was able to 
conclude in Prysock that “nothing in the warnings . . . suggested any 
limitation on the right to the presence of appointed counsel,” and the Court 
expressly distinguished cases where “the reference to appointed counsel 
132 Id. at 357. 
133 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204 (emphasis added) (citing Prysock’s observation, 453 U.S. 
at 358–59, that the state appellate court disapproved of the warnings given there because 
Prysock “was not explicitly informed of his right to have an attorney appointed before 
further questioning”). 
134 Prysock, 453 U.S. at 355. 
135 Id. at 361. 
136 Id. at 364 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the California Court of Appeal 
opinion). 
398 KIT KINPORTS [Vol. 101 
was linked with some future point in time after police interrogation.”137
Likewise, in Duckworth the suspect was told that he had “a right to 
talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have 
him with you during questioning,” and that “this right to the advice and 
presence of a lawyer” applied “even if you cannot afford to hire one.”
  In 
Powell, by contrast, the conclusion that no timing restriction was placed on 
the right to counsel is much harder to reach. 
138  
The Supreme Court concluded that the police thereby “touched all of the 
bases required by Miranda.”139  The fact that the police additionally 
informed Eagan, “[w]e have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be 
appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court” did not, in the 
Court’s mind, undermine the validity of the warnings.140  This extra 
statement “accurately described” the practice in Indiana, the Court 
explained, and “simply anticipate[d]” what the Court thought “must be [a] 
relatively commonplace” question.141  Thus, as the Powell dissenters 
pointed out, in both Prysock and Duckworth the police “added additional, 
truthful information” that was “arguably misleading,” whereas in Powell 
the warnings actually “omit[ted] one of a suspect’s rights.”142
Though the ruling in Powell therefore extended the Supreme Court’s 
precedents and made more than an incremental change in the law, the Court 
attempted to defend it on the pragmatic ground that police should be 
permitted to use “[d]ifferent words” in administering Miranda so long as 




137 Id. at 360–61 (majority opinion); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 484 
(1966) (describing as “consistent with the procedure which we delineate today” the FBI 
warnings in use at that time, which referred generally to “a right to counsel” without 
specifying that the right applied during interrogation or suggesting any limits on the timing 
of the right). 
  The Duckworth Court 
138 Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989) (emphasis added).  Eagan was also 
informed that he had “the right to stop answering at any time until you’ve talked to a 
lawyer.”  Id.  For further discussion of this warning, see infra notes 350–54 and 
accompanying text. 
139 Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203. 
140 Id. at 198. 
141 Id. at 204.  But cf. Yale Kamisar, Duckworth v. Eagan: A Little-Noticed Miranda 
Case That May Cause Much Mischief, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 552 (1989) (concluding that 
the Court’s decision “dealt Miranda a heavy blow”); George C. Thomas III, Separated at 
Birth but Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 1081, 1107–08 (2001) (observing that “if the principal function of [Miranda] warnings 
is to dispel the inherent compulsion of police interrogation, the warnings in Duckworth don’t 
seem particularly well fitted for the job” because they “seem to promise an appointed lawyer 
only if the suspect is arraigned at some later time”). 
142 Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1212 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
143 Id. at 1206 (majority opinion); see also id. (refusing to find a “precise formulation 
necessary to meet Miranda’s requirements”). 
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similarly expressed reluctance to suppress a confession simply because the 
police deviated slightly from the wording suggested in Miranda for fear that 
law enforcement personnel “may not always have access to [a] printed 
Miranda warning[], or . . . may inadvertently depart from [their] routine.”144  
Consistent with common practice today, however,145 the warnings given to 
Powell were read from a printed form,146
Moreover, the decision in Powell creates an opportunity for police 
departments to circumvent Miranda by adopting waiver forms that are 
misleading and require suspects to read between the lines in order to 
understand their rights.  The Powell Court responded to the argument that 
its decision gives law enforcement an incentive “to end-run Miranda by 
amending their warnings to introduce ambiguity” by echoing the Solicitor 
General’s underwhelming assertion that the police “‘have little reason to 
assume the litigation risk of experimenting with novel Miranda 
formulations.’”
 thus mitigating the Court’s 
pragmatic concerns. 
147  The Court might have a point with respect to “novel” 
ways of tinkering with Miranda’s language, but Powell certainly opens the 
door for other police departments to adopt the Tampa waiver form approved 
by the Court.  And while the State maintained that there was no flurry of 
movement following Duckworth to use the specific “if and when you go to 
court” language upheld in that case,148 the Court’s decision in Duckworth 
did generally lead to “an unconstrained proliferation of warnings.”149
In fact, there was some discussion before the Supreme Court 
concerning the reasons motivating the Tampa Police Department to adopt 
the particular wording at issue in Powell—especially given that an earlier 
version of the Tampa waiver form (like those in use in the “vast majority” 
of police departments elsewhere in Florida
 
150) unambiguously explained 
that the right to counsel applied “prior to or during” interrogation.151
 
144 Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203. 
  The 
145 See 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.5(c), at 708; Godsey, supra note 59, at 807 
n.101. 
146 See Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200. 
147 Id. at 1206 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 6, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (No. 08-1175)).   
148 See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 24, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (No. 08-1175). 
149 Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1590 (2008). 
150 Rigterink v. State, 2 So. 3d 221, 254 (Fla. 2009); see also Roberts v. State, 874 So. 2d 
1225, 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (observing that the vast majority of waiver forms used 
in Florida included language indicating that the suspect “is entitled to an attorney during 
questioning, or words to that effect”).  
151 Thompson v. State, 595 So. 2d 16, 17 (Fla. 1992) (“‘I further understand that prior to 
or during this interview that I have the right to have an attorney present.’”) (quoting Tampa 
Police Department Form 310 (1984)). 
400 KIT KINPORTS [Vol. 101 
State claimed that the new form was “apparently adopted as a result of 
litigation” culminating in a Florida Supreme Court decision disapproving of 
the prior warning.152  But that state supreme court opinion invalidated an 
entirely different portion of the Tampa waiver form, on the theory that it did 
not sufficiently inform suspects of the right to have an attorney “at no 
cost.”153  As Professor Richard Leo noted, “[w]hile the record does not 
firmly establish the Tampa Police Department’s motives” for amending its 
waiver form, “empirical research demonstrating that law enforcement often 
manipulates its interrogation strategies to undermine Miranda casts doubt 
upon the Solicitor General’s presumption that there is some innocuous 
explanation for the change.”154
In addition, Powell cannot be defended on the pragmatic ground that it 
avoids disrupting law enforcement practices nationwide.  In fact, the 
version of the warnings the Tampa police came up with was something of 
an outlier; surveys show that the overwhelming majority of police 
departments expressly inform suspects they have the right to have an 
attorney present during the interrogation session.
 
155  Moreover, adding the 
four words “and during the interview” to the sentence “You have the right 
to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions” is a minor and 
easily implemented change that would not add appreciably to the length or 
complexity of the Tampa waiver form.156  And it does not run afoul of the 
Court’s pragmatic reluctance to insist on “rigidity in the form of the 
required warnings”:157
 
152 Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 
 the warning could be phrased in multiple other ways, 
for example, “and while we are chatting,” “and in the interrogation room,” 
etc. 
148, at 26 n.11. 
153 Thompson, 595 So. 2d at 18.  The contested part of the earlier warning form provided: 
“‘I further understand that if I am unable to hire an attorney and I desire to consult with an 
attorney or have one present during this interview that I may do so and this interview will 
terminate.’”  Id. at 17 (quoting Tampa Police Department Form 310 (1984)) (emphasis 
omitted). 
154 Brief for Professor Richard A. Leo as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 16, 
Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (No. 08-1175); see also id. at 17 (noting that a Tampa Police 
Department Legal Bulletin from June 2009 “outlined several techniques that officers could 
use to minimize the chance that a suspect will invoke his right to counsel”). 
155 See Richard Rogers et al., The Language of Miranda Warnings in American 
Jurisdictions: A Replication and Vocabulary Analysis, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 124, 133 
(2008) (surveying Miranda warnings given in almost 950 jurisdictions nationwide and 
reporting that more than 95% included language informing suspects of the right to counsel 
“during questioning” or “before and during questioning”). 
156 Cf. Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 148, at 26 n.11 (defending the waiver form 
read to Powell on the grounds that it was “substantially less complex,” shorter, and less 
“arcane” and “legalistic” than the previous form in use in Tampa). 
157 California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981). 
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Not only is the result in Powell hard to defend on pragmatic grounds, 
but this case, just like Shatzer, could easily have been decided in the 
defendant’s favor.  Miranda was based on the fundamental premise that 
safeguards are needed to “dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 
surroundings.”158  Given the anxiety and disorientation suspects feel as a 
result of that coerciveness, empirical research suggests they often do not 
really comprehend the information Miranda mandates that they be given.159
Moreover, the majority’s interpretation of the warning given to Powell 
was not the only plausible construction of the Tampa waiver form.  The 
police specifically informed Powell that he had the right to “talk to a lawyer 
before answering any of our questions” and, if he did not have the funds to 
hire an attorney, one would be appointed for him “without cost and before 
any questioning.”
  
Any imprecision, ambiguity, or internal inconsistency in the language used 
by the police cannot help but diminish even further their level of 
understanding. 
160  The Supreme Court read those sentences as 
“communicat[ing] that Powell could consult with a lawyer before 
answering any particular question.”161  But they could also refer, as the 
state courts believed, to the time period prior to the onset of the 
interrogation session.162  The Powell majority also asserted that this 
language “merely conveyed when Powell’s right to an attorney became 
effective”—i.e., “before he answered any questions at all”—and did not 
“indicate[] that counsel’s presence would be restricted after the questioning 
commenced.”163
 
158 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966); see also Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1203 
(noting that Miranda’s right to counsel “addresses our particular concern that ‘[t]he 
circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the 
will of one merely made aware of his privilege [to remain silent]’”) (quoting Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 469). 
  Again, however, that is not the only defensible 
interpretation.  Arguably, this portion of the warnings expressly linked the 
159 See, e.g., Rogers et al., supra note 155, at 129 (reporting that less than one percent of 
Miranda warnings “can be understood with a 5th grade reading level” and “[t]he large 
majority . . . require at least a 7th grade reading comprehension,” and concluding that “[i]n 
light of widespread illiteracy among correctional populations, this finding is crucial”); 
Weisselberg, supra note 149, at 1577 (finding that “many warnings demand a greater 
educational background than many suspects possess” and often suspects are “substantially 
impaired with respect to their ability to understand their Miranda rights”). 
160 Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1200 (2010) (emphasis added). 
161 Id. at 1205 (emphasis added). 
162 See State v. Powell, 998 So. 2d 531, 540 (Fla. 2008) (commenting that “the right . . . 
to talk with a lawyer before answering questions . . . is not the functional equivalent of 
having the lawyer present with you during questioning”); Powell v. State, 969 So. 2d 1060, 
1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (same). 
163 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1205. 
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right to counsel to the time period prior to interrogation and did not 
communicate that Powell had the right to have a lawyer with him during the 
interview as well.  While the Powell majority thought it “counterintuitive” 
for a “reasonable suspect” to assume that her attorney would not be allowed 
in the interrogation room and instead that she would be “obligated, or 
allowed, to hop in and out” of the room in order to consult with counsel,164 
that is precisely what grand jury witnesses must do in many jurisdictions in 
order to seek legal advice from their lawyers.165
Importantly, the final portion of the Tampa warning advised Powell 
that he had “the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during 
this interview.”
 
166  While the majority has a point that this language may 
imply that Powell “could exercise” the right to counsel “while the 
interrogation was underway,”167 it is also possible—as Justice Stevens 
argued in dissent—that this “catchall clause does not meaningfully clarify 
Powell’s rights” because it only told him he could “exercise the previously 
listed rights at any time” and those did not include the right to have an 
attorney with him during the interrogation.168
Perhaps the majority properly interpreted the waiver form consistent 
with a “commonsense reading,” whereas Justice Stevens was guilty of 
“examin[ing] the words employed [by the police] ‘as if construing a will or 
defining the terms of an easement.’”
  Alternatively, the “before” 
references and the final sentence could be viewed as giving conflicting 
signals about the nature of a suspect’s right to counsel, thus creating 
confusion. 
169  Interestingly, however, in other 




interpretation of the words suspects happen to choose during interrogation.  
Thus, for example, the Court has drawn a distinction depending on which of 
the bundle of Miranda rights a suspect invokes—the right to silence or the 
165 See 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 8.14(c).  Justice Alito made this point at oral 
argument, although Powell’s counsel responded that most people have not appeared before a 
grand jury.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–42, 56–57, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (No. 
08-1175). 
166 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200. 
167 Id. at 1205. 
168 Id. at 1212 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also State v. Powell, 998 
So. 2d 531, 541 (Fla. 2008) (making the same point). 
169 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204–05 (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 
(1989)). 
170 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 165, at 16 (argument made by the State of 
Florida’s attorney). 
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right to counsel171—and also refused to interpret a suspect’s statement, 
“[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer,” as a successful invocation of the right 
to counsel.172
Although the Court could easily have defended a decision in Powell’s 
favor, its ruling will not necessarily have a catastrophic impact on 
Miranda’s protections.  Anxious suspects facing the coercive pressures of 
custodial interrogation may be unlikely to distinguish fine variations in the 
precise wording police use to communicate their rights.  Moreover, Powell 
did not retreat from the well-established proposition that Miranda entitles 
suspects to the presence of a lawyer in the interrogation room,
  Such strict, formalistic interpretations of suspects’ words are 
inconsistent with Powell’s generous reading of the Tampa Police 
Department’s waiver form. 
173 and the 
outcome of the case seemed to hinge on the final sentence in the warnings 
given by the Tampa police.  Without the additional information that Powell 
could exercise his rights “at any time . . . during this interview,” it is not 
obvious the Court would have been willing to overlook the “before” 
references in the right-to-counsel warning.  “In combination,” the Court 
made clear, “the two warnings” adequately apprised Powell of his right to 
have an attorney with him during interrogation.174
Symbolically, moreover, the Powell opinion was not one-sided.  The 





171 Compare Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (holding that the police must 
“‘scrupulously honor[]’” the rights of a suspect who invokes the right to silence, but are not 
absolutely barred from reinitiating interrogation after some time has elapsed) (quoting 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)), with Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 
484–85 (1981) (deciding, by contrast, that a suspect who invokes the right to counsel may 
not be interrogated “until counsel has been made available to him”).  For further discussion 
of this dichotomy, see infra notes 
  And the Court did not take the bait offered 
204–07 and accompanying text. 
172 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994).  For further discussion of the reach 
of Davis, see infra notes 196–240 and accompanying text. 
173 See Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1203 (observing that “an individual held for questioning 
‘must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the 
lawyer with him during interrogation’”) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471); see also supra 
note 113 and accompanying text. 
174 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1205; see also id. (supporting the conclusion that “the warning 
communicated that the right to counsel carried forward to and through the interrogation” by 
observing that Powell was told he “could seek his attorney’s advice before responding to 
‘any of [the officers’] questions’ and ‘at any time . . . during th[e] interview’”). 
175 Id. at 1199. 
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by the State and resort to a balancing test in reaching its decision in this 
case.176
Although the Powell decision was fact-bound and its impact likely to 
be somewhat limited, it did deviate from both Supreme Court precedent and 
lower court case law.  Furthermore, the Court’s attempt to justify its ruling 
on pragmatic grounds was not particularly convincing, though the 
narrowness of the decision gives the police only limited room to try to 
circumvent Miranda by rewording their warnings. 
 
IV. BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS 
Even if Maryland v. Shatzer and Florida v. Powell can be viewed as 
making only modest changes to Miranda, Berghuis v. Thompkins,177 the last 
of the three Miranda opinions issued during the Court’s 2009 Term, is an 
entirely different story.  After Thompkins was arrested and jailed on murder 
charges, he was interrogated for about three hours by two Southfield, 
Michigan police officers despite the fact that he had not waived his rights.  
He was first given Miranda warnings by one of the officers, Detective 
Helgert, but refused to sign a form indicating that he understood his 
rights.178  Helgert gave inconsistent testimony as to whether or not 
Thompkins indicated verbally that he understood his rights,179 although 
there was evidence that he was literate and familiar with English.180
At that point, the officers immediately began the interrogation process.  
They spent more than two hours trying to convince Thompkins that “this 
was his chance to explain his version of events.”
 
181  The police “us[ed] the 
ostrich head in the sand metaphor,” telling Thompkins, “[y]ou need to help 
yourself, you need to put forth an explanation.”182  According to Detective 
Helgert, Thompkins was “[l]argely . . . silent” and “uncommunicative.”183
 
176 Cf. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 
  
120, at 26 n.9 (analogizing other 
Supreme Court opinions that balanced the costs and benefits of suppressing confessions).  
For discussion of the Court’s use of a balancing test in other confession cases, see supra 
notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
177 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
178 The form, entitled “Notification of Constitutional Rights and Statement,” set out the 
Miranda warnings and then asked, “Do you understand each of these rights that I have 
explained to you?,” followed by a space for the suspect’s signature.  See Brief for Petitioner 
at 60, Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 08-1470). 
179 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2267 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
180 At Helgert’s request, Thompkins read one of the warnings on the form aloud.  See 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256. 
181 Joint Appendix at 10a, Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 08-1470) (testimony of 
Detective Helgert). 
182 Id. at 150a. 
183 Id. at 19a, 10a. 
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He “sat there and listened” and “spent a lot of his time . . . simply holding 
his head looking down.”184  He made eye contact only a “few times,” in 
response to Helgert’s request that Thompkins “look at me and pay 
attention.”185  Helgert described the conversation as “very, very one-sided,” 
“nearly a monologue,” with Thompkins speaking or nodding his head only 
“very sporadically.”186  When he did speak, Thompkins said only “a word 
or two,” “[a] ‘yeah’, or a ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know.’”187  The only other words 
Thompkins uttered were that he “didn’t want a peppermint” the police 
offered to him and that “the chair that he was sitting in was hard.”188
After about two hours and forty-five minutes, Detective Helgert 
decided to “take a different tac[k], . . . a spiritual tac[k],”
 
189 and asked 
Thompkins whether he believed in God.  Thompkins replied, “Yes,” and his 
eyes “well[ed] up with tears.”190  The officer followed up by inquiring 
whether Thompkins prayed to God, and Thompkins again answered, “Yes.”  
Finally, Helgert asked, “Have you prayed to God to forgive you for 
shooting that boy down?”191  For the third time, Thompkins responded, 
“Yes.”  He said nothing further other than “I ain’t writing nothing down,”192 
and the interrogation session ended approximately fifteen minutes later.193
Rejecting Thompkins’s argument that his incriminating statement was 
taken in violation of Miranda, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four opinion, 
concluded both that Thompkins never invoked his right to silence and that 
he impliedly waived that right.  The decision broke down into five separate 
 
 
184 Id. at 22a, 152a. 
185 Id. at 11a, 149a. 
186 Id. at 10a, 17a, 9a. 
187 Id. at 23a. 
188 Id. at 152a. 
189 Id. at 10a–11a. 
190 Id. at 11a. 
191 Id. at 20a. 
192 Id. at 11a. 
193 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2257.  The Court did not deny that Thompkins was 
subjected to interrogation, repeatedly referring to the session as “the interrogation.”  See, 
e.g., id. at 2256–57, 2262–63.  Moreover, the detectives used classic interrogation 
techniques, which include “focusing [suspects’] attention on the importance of telling [their] 
story,” Leo & White, supra note 22, at 435, thereby “distorting suspects’ perceptions of their 
choices by leading them to believe that they will benefit by making a statement.”  
Weisselberg, supra note 149, at 1537–38; see also Joint Appendix, supra note 181, at 15a, 
20a (testimony of Detective Helgert) (acknowledging that the officers “did enter into an 
interview mode” after Thompkins refused to sign the rights form, and then brought up 
religion on the theory that Thompkins would likely be “[m]ore vulnerable to interrogation” if 
he had “a deep faith”).  In any event, Thompkins’s incriminating statement came in response 
to a direct investigative question, which clearly satisfied the “express questioning” portion of 
the definition of “interrogation” set forth in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 
(1980). 
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elements.  In the invocation discussion, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
majority determined, first, that the unambiguous invocation requirement 
applies to suspects who wish to invoke their right to remain silent.  Second, 
the majority impliedly refused to limit this clear invocation rule to those 
who make a preliminary waiver of their rights.  And third, the Court held 
that Thompkins did not invoke his right to silence by remaining silent.  In 
the waiver discussion, the Court found that Thompkins impliedly waived 
Miranda by failing to invoke his rights and then “making an uncoerced 
statement to the police.”194  Finally, the Court upheld the concept of pre-
waiver interrogation, refusing to mandate that police secure a waiver of 
Miranda before they begin interrogating a suspect.195
Although the Court’s invocation analysis ratified the views adopted by 
some lower courts, its discussion of implied waiver and pre-waiver 
interrogation effected sweeping changes in the law, deviating from or at 
least dramatically expanding Supreme Court precedent.  Moreover, none of 
the five components of the Court’s opinion can be reconciled with a 
pragmatic approach to Miranda.  Together, they allow law enforcement 
officials to do a complete end run around Miranda, reducing the Warren 
Court’s decision to a formalistic requirement that warnings be read and 
otherwise reinstating the voluntariness due process test. 
 
A. INVOKING THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 
The Court reached its decision that Thompkins never asserted his right 
to silence in three steps: first, that the clear invocation rule announced in 
Davis v. United States196
In Davis, the Court held that a suspect who wishes to assert the 
Miranda right to counsel, and thereby enjoy the protection of the Edwards 
 governs the right to remain silent as well as the 
Miranda right to counsel; second, that Davis presumably applies even 
where suspects did not initially waive their Miranda rights; and third, that 
Thompkins did not unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent by 
essentially remaining silent. 
 
194 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264. 
195 Because this case came to the federal courts on habeas, the Sixth Circuit had applied 
the deferential standard of review mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which bars the federal courts from granting habeas relief on 
“any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court,” unless the state court’s ruling 
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006); see Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2259. 
196 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
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line of cases,197 “must articulate his desire to have counsel present 
sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances 
would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”198  Holding 
that the same unambiguous invocation requirement applies to the right to 
remain silent, the Thompkins majority found “no principled reason to adopt 
different standards” depending on which Miranda right a particular suspect 
asserted.199  In defending this position, Thompkins also resurrected Davis’s 
argument that a clear invocation requirement “results in an objective inquiry 
that ‘avoid[s] difficulties of proof and . . . provide[s] guidance to officers’ 
on how to proceed in the face of ambiguity.”200
Unlike Shatzer and Powell, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Thompkins was a closely divided one, with the four dissenters objecting that 
“Davis’ clear statement rule is . . . a poor fit for the right to silence.”
 
201  
Nevertheless, the majority’s position aligned with the view taken by the 
lower courts202
 
197 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (holding that a suspect who 
invokes the right to counsel “is not subject to further interrogation . . . until counsel has been 
made available to him”).  The line of cases following Edwards is described supra at note 
—although those courts had not engaged in much analysis, 
39 
and accompanying text. 
198 Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; see also id. (warning that a suspect will not be deemed to 
have asserted her Miranda right to counsel if she “makes a reference to an attorney that is 
ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have 
understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel”) (emphasis added).  
Davis’s clear invocation rule has deservedly come under heavy fire.  See, e.g., Janet E. 
Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police 
Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 320 (1993) (arguing that the expectation that suspects will 
make “direct, assertive, unqualified invocations of counsel” is not only inconsistent with 
Miranda’s basic premise that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, but is also “a 
gendered doctrine that privileges male speech norms, . . . thus disadvantag[ing] women and 
other marginalized and relatively powerless groups in society”); Kinports, supra note 96, at 
106–07 (observing that Davis’s reasonable police officer standard strayed from the focus on 
the suspect’s perspective in other Miranda cases). 
199 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2257. 
200 Id. at 2260 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 458–59). 
201 Id. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (endorsing instead use of the “scrupulously 
honored” test here, which is described infra at note 204 and accompanying text).  The 
dissent acknowledged, however, that under the deferential standard of review imposed by the 
AEDPA, “it is indeed difficult to conclude that the state court’s application of our 
[invocation] precedents was objectively unreasonable.”  Id. at 2274; see supra note 195. 
202 See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 450 F.3d 1201, 1211–12 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“‘[E]very circuit that has addressed the issue squarely has concluded that Davis applies to 
both components of Miranda: the right to counsel and the right to remain silent.’”) (quoting 
Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 239 (1st Cir. 1999)); Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: 
Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 773, 784–87 (2009). 
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extensive or otherwise, but typically had just assumed that Davis applies in 
both situations.203
Despite the assumption made by the lower courts, the Supreme Court 
has for years drawn a distinction between suspects who invoke the right to 
counsel, thereby triggering the protections of the Edwards line of cases, and 
those who invoke the right to silence.  Michigan v. Mosley is the controlling 
precedent for the latter group of suspects, and it requires only that police 
“‘scrupulously honor[]’” the rights of a suspect who asserts the right to 
remain silent.
 
204  Thus, while the Davis Court feared that extending 
Edwards’s “‘“rigid” prophylactic rule’”205 would create a “‘wholly 
irrational obstacle[] to legitimate police investigative activity’” in cases 
where a suspect was not clearly asking for a lawyer,206 that concern “applies 
with less force” to Mosley’s “more flexible form of prophylaxis.”207
Discounting the relevance of this dual line of cases, the Thompkins 
majority cited Solem v. Stumes for the proposition that “‘[m]uch of the logic 
and language of [Mosley] . . . could be applied to the invocation of the 
[Miranda right to counsel].’”
 
208  But Stumes actually cuts the other way.  In 
fact, the sentence from Stumes quoted in Thompkins began by pointing out 
that Mosley “distinguish[ed] the right to counsel from the right to 
silence.”209  Moreover, the issue before the Court in Stumes was whether 
Edwards ought to apply retroactively.  In declining to do so, Stumes relied 
in part on the fact that Edwards had “establish[ed] a new rule” that was not 
“‘clearly’ or ‘distinctly’ foreshadowed,” and therefore that law enforcement 
officials could not be “faulted if they did not anticipate its per se 
approach.”210
 
203 See Strauss, supra note 
  Given that Mosley predated Edwards, the Court’s reasoning 
202, at 786 (noting that most courts acted “perfunctorily,” 
none offered “any detailed explanation,” and “[e]ven when some analysis is provided, it is 
extraordinarily cursory”). 
204 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 479 (1966)) (finding the standard met on the facts there, where a different detective 
approached Mosley two hours after he invoked his right to silence, reread the Miranda 
warnings, and asked him about a different crime). 
205 Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (per curiam) 
(quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979))). 
206 Id. at 460 (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102). 
207 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2275 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Strauss, supra 
note 202, at 818–19 (arguing that the clear invocation rule should be “the ‘price’ of 
Edwards,” whereas “the combination of Davis and Mosley stacks the deck for the state” and 
has “an undesirable synergistic effect” that “place[s the police] in a win–win situation”). 
208 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 648 (1984)). 
209 Stumes, 465 U.S. at 648. 
210 Id. at 647–49 (also citing Mosley in support of the observation that “[t]he Court had 
several times refused to adopt per se rules governing the waiver of Miranda rights”). 
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in Stumes confirms the dichotomy between the two sets of precedents rather 
than supporting Thompkins’s decision to conflate them. 
In addition to ignoring the split between Mosley and Edwards, the 
Thompkins Court’s decision to extend Davis to the right to remain silent 
was not mandated by a pragmatic approach to Miranda.  Although 
Thompkins echoed Davis’s plea for readily administrable rules, Justice 
Souter’s opinion in Davis offered the obvious counterpoint: if the police 
wish to be “relieve[d] . . . of any responsibility for guessing” a suspect’s 
preferences, they can simply “stop the[] interrogation and ask [the suspect] 
to make his choice clear,”211 an approach the Davis majority called “good 
police practice” but expressly declined to require.212
The second step of Thompkins’s invocation analysis was an implicit 
one: the Court silently assumed that Davis applies in cases where suspects 
did not initially waive their rights.  After receiving Miranda warnings, 
Davis executed a written waiver of his rights and expressly agreed to talk to 
the investigators.  Only later, after about ninety minutes of questioning, did 
he make what the Court considered an ambiguous invocation of his right to 
counsel by saying “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer.”
 
213
A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel after having that 
right explained to him has indicated his willingness to deal with the police unassisted.  
Although Edwards provides an additional protection—if a suspect subsequently 
  That preliminary 
waiver was an integral part of the Davis Court’s reasoning.  In justifying the 
decision to require an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, the 
Court explained: 
 
211 Davis, 512 U.S. at 474–75, 467 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see also 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2277 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (likewise endorsing this 
“straightforward mechanism”). 
212 Davis, 512 U.S. at 461.  Although the dominant lower court approach prior to Davis 
mandated that police follow this “good practice,” see id. at 466–67 & n.1 (Souter, J., 
concurring in the judgment), in the wake of Davis, it now “appears that most [officers] do 
not” stop to clarify the suspect’s wishes.  Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United 
States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1011, 1058 (2007). 
213 Davis, 512 U.S. at 462.  But cf. Ainsworth, supra note 198, at 320 (observing that 
“relatively powerless groups . . . are more likely to use less direct and assertive patterns of 
speech”); Strauss, supra note 202, at 789 (finding that “many suspects subjected to the 
intimidation inherent in custodial interrogation employ modal verbs—indirect, tentative 
speech patterns”); Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, Cops and Robbers: Selective 
Literalism in American Criminal Law, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 229, 249 (2004) (pointing out 
that “[p]eople tend to hedge when they are uncertain about something, but they also do it as a 
means of expressing politeness,” and even “in ordinary conversation,” “most people speak 
less directly, . . . especially when they impose on someone else by making a request or 
command”). 
410 KIT KINPORTS [Vol. 101 
requests an attorney, questioning must cease—it is one that must be affirmatively 
invoked by the suspect.214
The Davis Court’s statement of its holding was likewise expressly 
contingent on an initial waiver,
 
215 and the Thompkins dissenters were 
therefore critical of the majority’s decision to “ignore[] this aspect of 
Davis.”216  Nevertheless, other language in Davis was not so limited,217 and 
a substantial number of lower courts had applied the Davis standard even 
where no preliminary waiver occurred.218  This question had provoked more 
of a conflict than the extension of Davis to the right to silence, however, 
and some courts had expressly restricted the clear invocation rule to 
suspects who initially waived their rights.219
Again, it is difficult to reconcile any extension of Davis with a 
pragmatic approach to Miranda when all the police need to do in cases of 
ambiguity is ask the suspect to clarify her preferences.  Moreover, limiting 
the clear invocation rule to the post-waiver context would have assuaged 
the Davis Court’s concerns about interrupting the flow of the interrogation 
process and requiring the “cessation of questioning” in the face of any 




214 Davis, 512 U.S. at 460–61. 
  As the Second Circuit pointed out, the 
prosecution has the burden of proving that a suspect waived Miranda, but 
once that burden is satisfied, it is appropriate to give the suspect the burden 
of establishing that she “resurrected rights previously waived” by clearly 
215 Id. at 461 (“We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the 
Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the 
suspect clearly requests an attorney.”). 
216 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2275 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
217 See Davis, 512 U.S. at 460 (while acknowledging that its ruling “might disadvantage 
some suspects who—because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of 
other reasons—will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to 
have a lawyer present,” the Court expressed the view that “the primary protection afforded 
suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves” and “‘[f]ull 
comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel 
whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process’”) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 
U.S. 412, 427 (1986)).  For further discussion of Davis’s “primary protection” language and 
Moran v. Burbine, see infra notes 266–75 and accompanying text. 
218 See 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.9(g), at 866 n.185; Weisselberg, supra note 
149, at 1579. 
219 E.g., United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1079–80 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing state court opinions as 
well); see also 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.9(g), at 866 & n.185. 
220 Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; see also id. (likewise expressing reluctance to require police 
to “cease questioning,” and observing that a “statement [that] fails to meet the requisite level 
of clarity . . . does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect”). 
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invoking them.221
Finally, applying Davis’s clear invocation rule to the facts before it, 
the Court was unsympathetic to Thompkins’s argument that he asserted his 
right to remain silent “by not saying anything for a sufficient period of 
time.”
  That shifting of the burden envisioned by Davis does not 
make sense in a case where the suspect never waived Miranda in the first 
place. 
222  Thompkins “did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he 
did not want to talk with the police,” the Court noted, and therefore he did 
not effectively assert his right to silence.223  This final step in the majority’s 
invocation analysis was again challenged by the four dissenters, who 
pointed out that “[a]dvising a suspect that he has a ‘right to remain silent’ is 
unlikely to convey that he must speak (and must do so in some particular 
fashion) to ensure the right will be protected.”224
While a number of lower courts had not been particularly generous to 




221 Plugh, 576 F.3d at 143; see also Rodriguez, 518 F.3d at 1079 (“Davis addressed what 
the suspect must do to restore his Miranda rights after having already knowingly and 
voluntarily waived them.  It did not address what the police must obtain, in the initial waiver 
context, to begin questioning.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 some courts had 
ruled that a defendant who is silent is obviously asserting the right to 
222 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259–60 (2010). 
223 Id. at 2260. 
224 Id. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Again, however, the dissent conceded that 
Thompkins might lose under the AEDPA standard of review.  See id. at 2274 (observing that 
the Court’s precedents did not discuss whether a suspect who is “uncooperative and nearly 
silent for 2 hours and 45 minutes” has invoked the right to silence); see also supra note 195. 
225 See Strauss, supra note 202, at 775 (noting that “[j]udges have gone to extraordinary 
lengths to classify even seemingly clear invocations as ambiguous invocations which can be 
ignored by the police”); Tiersma & Solan, supra note 213, at 250 (“[A]ll too many judges 
read requests for counsel the same way they would read a deed or promissory note: they 
expect that suspects during interrogation will speak the way that lawyers write, leading them 
to interpret the statements in a very literal way.”).  For illustrations of statements that have 
been found insufficient to invoke the right to silence, see Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2277 n.9 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I’m not going to talk about nothin’,” and “I just don’t think that 
I should say anything”); Strauss, supra note 202, at 789–90 & n.83 (“I can’t say anything 
more now,” “I don’t know if I should speak to you,” and “Can I go?”); Weisselberg, supra 
note 149, at 1580 (“I don’t have nothing to say” and “I think it’s about time for me to stop 
talking”). 
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remain silent.226  The Solicitor General distinguished those cases on the 
ground that Thompkins did not maintain complete silence,227 but it is 
difficult to imagine how a suspect could be less communicative over the 
space of almost three hours than Thompkins.  During the course of what 
Detective Helgert described as “nearly a monologue,” Thompkins made one 
statement about a mint and another about his chair.228  Otherwise, he 
nodded his head and said “yeah,” “no,” or “I don’t know” only “very 
sporadically,”229 and in a context that the record does not specify.230  
Moreover, the Court did not decide the case on that narrow ground.  Rather, 
the Court suggested that a suspect must actually “[s]peak[] [u]p to [s]tay 
[s]ilent,”231 a proposition that the dissent appropriately called 
“counterintuitive[].”232
 
226 See United States v. Montana, 958 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that “a 
defendant’s silence in the face of repeated questioning has been held sufficient to invoke the 
Fifth Amendment privilege”); State v. Hodges, 77 P.3d 375, 377–78 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) 
(concluding that “[s]ilence in the face of repeated questioning over a period of time may 
constitute an invocation of the right to remain silent,” but finding no clear invocation there 
based on suspect’s silence in response to one question because he initially answered 
questions and “shortly thereafter answered a different officer’s question without hesitation”); 
see also 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 
  Once again, the right to remain silent differs on a 
fundamental practical level from the right to counsel: a suspect sitting in a 
police interrogation room must say something in order to trigger the 
appearance of an attorney, but need not say or do anything affirmative in 
order to actualize her unwillingness to talk to the police. 
69, § 6.9(g), at 853–54 & n.150, 857 n.158 (citing 
conflicting cases on this point, but concluding that “silence in the face of repeated 
questioning” should be enough); Strauss, supra note 202, at 792 (likewise citing conflicting 
cases, though noting that “[m]ost courts . . . seem to deem silence, even lengthy silence, as 
ambiguous”). 
227 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18, Thompkins, 
130 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 08-1470); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 178, at 29 (“This is 
not a case where a suspect remained silent.”). 
228 Joint Appendix, supra note 181, at 17a, 152a. 
229 Id. at 9a, 23a; see also supra notes 181–93 and accompanying text. 
230 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2270–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he record 
before us [is] silent as to the subject matter or context of even a single question to which 
Thompkins purportedly responded, other than the exchange about God and the statements 
respecting the peppermint and the chair.”); Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 587 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (noting that the detective’s testimony did not “provid[e] any context” for 
Thompkins’s occasional one-word statements, and concluding that the case would be very 
different had Thompkins “nodded his head in response to a question asking whether [he] 
wanted his side of the story to be known”) (emphasis omitted), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2250 
(2010). 
231 Editorial, Speaking up to Stay Silent, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at A24. 
232 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2278 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Strauss, supra 
note 202, at 792 (noting that silence may be “the ultimate invocation”). 
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Although the majority did not try to defend this third step in the 
invocation discussion on pragmatic grounds, the Solicitor General argued 
that police may not know whether a suspect who says nothing is invoking 
the right to remain silent or instead is “formulating an explanation of events 
that lessens his culpability, planning an alibi, or thinking through his 
options.”233  Additionally, the “scrupulously honor” standard endorsed by 
the Thompkins dissenters, as even they acknowledged, is “fact-specific” and 
“does not provide police with a bright-line rule.”234  Of course, however, it 
is the same standard that Mosley articulated and that law enforcement 
officials “have for nearly 35 years applied.”235  Moreover, it seems that 
Davis’s “reasonable police officer”236 should have known that someone like 
Thompkins—who managed to sit in virtual silence with his eyes cast down 
for almost three hours—was no longer “thinking through his options,” but 
had no interest in participating in the conversation.  And apparently that is 
precisely how Detective Helgert interpreted Thompkins’s behavior: at the 
suppression hearing, the officer responded affirmatively when asked 
whether Thompkins’s incriminating statement came “after [Thompkins] had 
consistently exercised his right to remain substantively silent for at least 
two hours and forty-five (45) minutes.”237
The Court’s tripartite analysis of Thompkins’s invocation claim is 
extremely cursory, taking up less than one page in the Supreme Court 
Reporter.  Moreover, the Court’s insistence that suspects speak with 
absolute precision is particularly ironic given its willingness just three 
months earlier in Florida v. Powell to afford a “commonsense reading” to 
the words the police use in administering Miranda warnings,
 
238 for fear that 
they “may inadvertently depart from routine practice.”239
 
233 Brief for the United States, supra note 
  If it makes sense 
to take the fluidity of the interrogation process into account and refuse to 
“examine the words employed [by the police] ‘as if construing a will or 
defining the terms of an easement,’” at minimum the same leniency should 
be accorded suspects, who are not in control of the situation and who are 
227, at 18 (concluding that silence does “not 
convey an unambiguous message”); see also Strauss, supra note 202, at 792 (observing that 
suspects could be silent because “they have not yet found a topic they want to discuss”). 
234 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
235 Id. 
236 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); see supra note 198 and 
accompanying text. 
237 Joint Appendix, supra note 181, at 20a; see also id. (When asked whether Thompkins 
“exercised [his right to remain silent] continuously for two hours and forty-five (45) minutes 
in terms of substantive responses to your attempts to elicit statements regarding this 
offense,” Helgert replied, “Much of the time.  Most of the time, yes.”). 
238 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1205 (2010). 
239 Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989). 
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facing the coercive pressures of custodial interrogation.240
B. WAIVING THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 
  In deciding 
otherwise, the Thompkins Court’s conclusory invocation discussion may 
have been consistent with some lower court case law, but it deviated from a 
pragmatic approach to Miranda. 
After finding that Thompkins never invoked his right to silence, the 
Court turned to the question of waiver.  Miranda required the prosecution to 
shoulder the burden of establishing that a suspect waived her rights, the 
Thompkins Court acknowledged, and Thompkins’s failure to assert his 
rights did not automatically satisfy that burden.241  As the Court noted in 
Smith v. Illinois, “[i]nvocation and waiver are entirely distinct inquiries, and 
the two must not be blurred by merging them together.”242  Nevertheless, 
the Court concluded that Thompkins did waive his rights under the two-part 
implied waiver doctrine set out in North Carolina v. Butler, where the 
Court suggested that a suspect’s “silence, coupled with an understanding of 
his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver,” constitutes an implied 
waiver of Miranda.243
First, the Court reasoned, there was sufficient evidence that 
Thompkins understood his rights, given that he “received a written copy of 
the Miranda warnings” and “could read and understand English.”
 
244  And, 
second, the one-word response he gave when Detective Helgert asked 
whether he had prayed to be forgiven for shooting the victim—even though 
it came “about three hours” later—was “sufficient to show a course of 
conduct indicating waiver.”245
 
240 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204 (quoting Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203). 
  “If Thompkins wanted to remain silent,” the 
Court explained, “he could have said nothing in response to Helgert’s 
questions, or he could have unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights and 
241 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (noting that “[e]ven absent 
the accused’s invocation of the right to remain silent,” a confession is not admissible “unless 
the prosecution can establish” a valid waiver of Miranda); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 470 (1966) (cautioning that the “failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a 
waiver”). 
242 Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam). 
243 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).  But cf. 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra 
note 69, § 6.9(d), at 832 (noting that “it has been argued with some force” that a suspect’s 
“‘acknowledgement of understanding adds nothing more to the circumstances beyond mere 
silence’” because “an understanding of rights and an intention to waive them are two 
different things”) (quoting 2 WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND 
CONFESSIONS 28-6 (2d ed. 1982)). 
244 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2262. 
245 Id. at 2263 (reasoning that “[p]olice are not required to rewarn suspects from time to 
time”). 
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ended the interrogation.”246  Justice Kennedy added that this conclusion was 
“confirmed” by the “sporadic answers” Thompkins gave to “questions 
throughout the interrogation,” but his opinion did not put much emphasis on 
that fact.247  He mentioned it only once; by contrast, he repeated several 
times that the implied waiver doctrine could be satisfied simply by an 
“uncoerced statement” combined with evidence that the Miranda warnings 
were “understood by the accused.”248  Here, again, the Court was deeply 
splintered, with the four dissenters objecting that the prosecutor’s burden of 
proving waiver could not be met “on a record consisting of three one-word 
answers, following 2 hours and 45 minutes of silence punctuated by a few 
largely nonverbal responses to unidentified questions.”249
Although the Thompkins majority did not discuss the state of the lower 
court case law, its implied waiver ruling effected a more dramatic change in 
the law than its invocation analysis.  The lower courts had split on the 
propriety of finding a “course of conduct indicating waiver” based solely on 
a suspect’s incriminating statements, but even the courts that had found the 
Butler standard satisfied tended to involve scenarios very different from 
Thompkins.  In most of those cases, the suspect explicitly acknowledged 
that she understood her rights, followed closely by an incriminating 
statement.  The courts were therefore able to say that those defendants, 
unlike Thompkins, “freely talk[ed]” to the police,
 
250 displayed “no 
hesitancy,”251 or participated in a “two-way conversation.”252
 
246 Id. 
  Moreover, 
other courts had expressly refused to uphold the validity of an implied 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 2262; see also id. at 2261 (“If the State establishes that a Miranda warning was 
given and the accused made an uncoerced statement, this showing, standing alone, is 
insufficient to demonstrate ‘a valid waiver’ of Miranda rights.  The prosecution must make 
the additional showing that the accused understood these rights.”); id. at 2263 (“Thompkins 
knowingly and voluntarily made a statement to police, so he waived his right to remain 
silent.”); id. at 2264 (“In sum, a suspect who has received and understood the Miranda 
warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by 
making an uncoerced statement to the police . . . .  Understanding his rights in full, 
[Thompkins] waived his right to remain silent by making a voluntary statement to the 
police.”). 
249 Id. at 2271 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
250 United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2008). 
251 State v. Kirtdoll, 136 P.3d 417, 423 (Kan. 2006). 
252 Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 241 (1st Cir. 1999); see also id. at 240–41 (surveying 
other federal cases and finding that “the implied waiver profile” included cases involving a 
“‘steady stream’ of speech” or “back-and-forth conversation”) (citing, respectively, Bradley 
v. Meachum, 918 F.2d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1990), and Baskin v. Clark, 956 F.2d 142, 146 (7th 
Cir. 1992)); 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.9(d), at 832 (maintaining that “while an 
acknowledgement of understanding should not inevitably carry the day, it is especially 
significant when defendant’s incriminating statement follows immediately thereafter”). 
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waiver made by a suspect who was initially unresponsive to police 
questioning.253  Thus, as Justice Sotomayor’s dissent pointed out, the courts 
generally “required a showing of words or conduct beyond inculpatory 
statements.”254
The Thompkins majority did, however, cite its own prior cases, 
claiming that its implied waiver ruling was consistent with precedent.  The 
Court acknowledged that Miranda not only spoke of the “heavy burden” 
required to demonstrate a waiver of rights but also made clear that waiver 
may not be “presumed simply from” a suspect’s “silence” or “simply from 
the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.”
 
255  But in the 
very next sentence, the Thompkins Court seemed to equivocate, observing 
that its post-Miranda decisions, “informed by . . . the whole course of law 
enforcement,” had rejected any requirement of “formal or express 
statements of waiver.”256
In fact, Butler conceded as much.  The Butler opinion quoted all of the 
relevant waiver language from Miranda set out in the prior paragraph.
  That statement is obviously unobjectionable in 
light of Butler, but the notion that waivers can be inferred does not diminish 
the fact that neither silence nor an eventual incriminating statement suffices 
to demonstrate any sort of waiver, express or implied. 
257  In 
addition, Butler independently referred to the Government’s burden of 
proof as “great” and pointed out that “[t]he courts must presume that a 
defendant did not waive his rights.”258
 
253 See United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1475 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to find 
implied waiver where suspect “maintained her silence for several minutes and, perhaps, as 
many as ten minutes” “[i]n the face of repeated questioning”); cf. United States v. Plugh, 576 
F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that suspect’s “refusal to sign [a waiver form] 
constituted an unequivocally negative answer to the question . . . whether he was willing to 
waive his rights”). 
  And subsequent Supreme Court 
254 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2270 n.4 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
255 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966), quoted in Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 
2261.  The Warren Court also observed that a “lengthy interrogation” preceding a confession 
is “strong evidence” of an invalid waiver.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.  For discussion of 
Thompkins’s response to this language, see infra notes 375–77 and accompanying text. 
256 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261. 
257 See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372–73 (1979) (quoting both the phrase 
“heavy burden” and the language making clear that neither silence nor a confession satisfies 
that burden); see also id. at 373 (“As was unequivocally said in Miranda, mere silence is not 
enough.”). 
258 Id. at 373; cf. Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470 (1980) (per curiam) (endorsing 
the view that presuming that a suspect understands her rights contravenes Miranda). 
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decisions likewise reiterated those concepts.259  Thompkins therefore made 
an unwarranted leap from the noncontroversial proposition that the 
prosecutor “does not need to show that a waiver of Miranda rights was 
express” to the conclusion that a suspect who “understood” her rights and 
made an “uncoerced statement” impliedly waived her rights.260
Moreover, the Thompkins Court shortchanged Miranda’s underlying 
goals, attempting to defend the position that waivers need not be “formal or 
express” by describing the “main purpose” of the landmark decision as 
“ensur[ing] that an accused is advised of and understands” her rights.
 
261  
While that was obviously one of Miranda’s objectives, it also intended to 
alleviate “the compelling influence of the interrogation.”262  Thus, the 
Miranda Court did indicate that “[f]or those unaware of the privilege, the 
warning is needed simply to make them aware of it.”263  But even “[m]ore 
important,” the Court continued, the warnings are “an absolute prerequisite 
in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere.”264  
As a result, the fact that a particular suspect understood her rights was not 
enough to satisfy the Miranda Court.  Rather, the Court warned, “we will 
not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of 
his rights” because, “whatever the background of the person interrogated, a 
warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its 
pressures.”265
Despite the fact that the Court clearly thought it was aiming higher in 
Miranda, Thompkins relied on two subsequent cases—Davis v. United 
 
 
259 See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988) (quoting Miranda’s “heavy 
burden” language); Tague, 444 U.S. at 470–71 (quoting Miranda’s phrase “heavy burden,” 
as well as the language in Butler characterizing the Government’s burden as “great” and 
refusing to allow presumptions of waiver); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 (1979) 
(likewise quoting Miranda’s “heavy burden” standard). 
260 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261, 2262. 
261 Id. at 2261. 
262 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966); see Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428, 435 (2000) (finding that “the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the 
line between voluntary and involuntary statements”); see also infra notes 302–06 and 
accompanying text. 
263 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. 
264 Id. (noting, in addition, that the warnings “show the individual that his interrogators 
are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it”). 
265 Id. at 468–69; see also id. (observing that “[a]ssessments of the knowledge the 
defendant possessed . . . can never be more than speculation,” whereas “a warning is a 
clearcut fact”); id. at 471–72 (admonishing that “[n]o amount of circumstantial evidence that 
the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead”).  For 
discussion of an additional way the Thompkins Court undermined Miranda—by resurrecting 
the voluntariness due process test—see infra notes 370–78 and accompanying text. 
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States266 and Moran v. Burbine267—for the proposition that “Miranda’s 
main protection lies in advising defendants of their rights” and therefore 
“less formal” waivers are permissible.268  To be sure, the Davis Court did 
observe that “‘the primary protection afforded suspects subject[ed] to 
custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves.’”269  The 
Thompkins Court, however, took this statement wildly out of context.  
Davis, the opinion which first articulated the clear invocation rule, was 
addressing what the Court called the “‘second layer of [Miranda] 
prophylaxis,’” the protection under Edwards (and Mosley) for suspects who 
assert their rights.270  Thus, several sentences later, the Davis Court said, 
“[a]lthough Edwards provides an additional protection—if a suspect 
subsequently requests an attorney, questioning must cease—it is one that 
must be affirmatively invoked by the suspect.”271  When read in context, 
then, the Davis Court was pointing out that the “primary protection” given 
suspects is Miranda’s first layer—the warning and waiver procedures set 
out in Miranda itself—and that suspects must act affirmatively in order to 
engage the second layer.  But Davis did not purport to address the nature of 
the first layer or to affect Miranda’s waiver requirements.  In fact, as noted 
above, the issue of waiver did not arise in that case because Davis expressly 
waived his rights prior to interrogation.272
Thompkins’s reliance on Moran v. Burbine is similarly misplaced; 
again, Thompkins accurately quoted its precedent but omitted the relevant 
context.  As the Thompkins Court pointed out, Burbine did include the 
observation that, “‘as Miranda holds, full comprehension of the rights to 
remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever 




266 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
  Put into context, 
however, it is obvious that the Burbine Court was explaining its decision 
not to require the police to provide suspects with additional information 
above and beyond what Miranda contemplates—there, that an attorney had 
267 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
268 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010). 
269 Id. at 2263 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 460); see also id. at 2259, 2261–62 (again 
citing Davis for this point). 
270 Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991)).  
For a description of Davis’s clear invocation rule, see supra notes 197–98 and accompanying 
text. 
271 Davis, 512 U.S. at 461. 
272 See supra text accompanying note 213. 
273 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986)); 
see also id. at 2261, 2262 (again citing Burbine for this proposition). 
2011] LOVE–HATE RELATIONSHIP WITH MIRANDA 419 
tried to contact Burbine.274  The Burbine Court did not intend even to 
address, much less “reduce[] the impact” of, Miranda’s core requirements 
or its waiver rules.  Like Davis, Burbine was a case where the suspect 
executed a written waiver of his rights; in fact, Burbine signed three waiver 
forms prior to being interrogated.275
In addition to undermining Miranda and misciting Davis and Burbine, 
Thompkins also dramatically extended North Carolina v. Butler.  The 
implied waiver standard articulated in that case required proof that the 
suspect understood her rights and engaged in “a course of conduct 
indicating waiver.”
  Thus, neither Davis nor Burbine 
supported the Thompkins Court’s grudging view of the policy goals 
underlying Miranda or its expansive view of the implied waiver doctrine. 
276  But the Thompkins majority took that notion much 
further in holding that a single “uncoerced statement” constituted “a course 
of conduct indicating waiver.”277  In fact, most of the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Butler was focused on rejecting the state supreme court’s 
“inflexible per se rule” that Miranda waivers must be express, and the 
Court did not even indicate whether the implied waiver standard was 
satisfied on the facts before it.278
Even so, Butler is a far cry from Thompkins.  Butler specifically and 
“repeatedly” acknowledged that he understood his rights, and he expressly 
agreed to talk to the police.
 
279  But he declined to sign a waiver form, 
saying “I will talk to you but I am not signing any form.”280  There was no 
indication that any time elapsed between Butler’s refusal to execute a 
written waiver and his answers to the FBI agent’s questions.281
 
274 The complete sentence read as follows: “Because, as Miranda holds, full 
comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel 
whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process, a rule requiring the police to 
inform the suspect of an attorney’s efforts to contact him would contribute to the protection 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege only incidentally, if at all.”  Burbine, 475 U.S. at 427. 
  Moreover, 
he participated fully in the conversation that followed, providing detailed 
275 See id. at 417–18. 
276 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). 
277 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2262. 
278 Butler, 441 U.S. at 375; see also id. at 370 (“We granted certiorari to consider 
whether [the North Carolina Supreme Court’s] per se rule reflects a proper understanding of 
the Miranda decision.”). 
279 State v. Butler, 244 S.E.2d 410, 412 (N.C. 1978). 
280 Butler, 441 U.S. at 371. 
281 See Butler, 244 S.E.2d at 412 (“Since defendant had stated he would talk to Officer 
Martinez, he was then asked ‘if he had participated in the armed robbery and he stated that 
he was there but that he did not actually participate as such in the armed robbery.’”) (quoting 
FBI agent’s testimony) (emphasis added). 
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responses to the agent’s inquiries.282  Thompkins, by contrast, refused to 
sign a form even acknowledging that he understood the Miranda warnings, 
and the record did not clearly indicate whether he verbally expressed an 
understanding of his rights.283
By extending Butler’s implied waiver doctrine to a case like 
Thompkins, the Court allows the police to “persist[] in repeated efforts to 
wear down [a suspect’s] resistance,” and then argue that she impliedly 
waived her rights as soon as she slips and says one responsive word.
  He then sat in virtual silence for almost three 
hours, ultimately uttering a single incriminating word.  The two cases are 
therefore very different in terms of each prong of Butler’s implied waiver 
standard—both the evidence that the defendant understood his Miranda 
rights and that he engaged in a “course of conduct indicating waiver.” 
284  
This result flies in the face of Miranda’s admonition that a finding of 
waiver cannot be predicated “simply [on] the fact that a confession was in 
fact eventually obtained.”285
Despite its lack of fidelity to precedent, the Thompkins Court 
purported to defend its waiver decision on pragmatic grounds, observing 
that “the practical constraints and necessities of interrogation” dictate that 
Miranda waivers be accomplished “through means less formal than a 
typical waiver on the record in a courtroom.”
  In Thompkins’s case, there was nothing—
other than the one-word “confession”—on which to base a finding of 
“conduct indicating waiver.” 
286
 
282 In response to the officer’s first question, Butler admitted being present at the scene 
of the robbery but denied participating in the crime.  See supra note 
  Likewise, the Court 
281.  At that point, the 
following conversation took place: 
“We asked him to explain a little further and he stated that he and an accomplice had been 
drinking heavily that day and were walking around and decided to rob a gas station.  They came 
up to a gas station where the attendant was locking up for the night and walked inside the station.  
[Butler] stated that the fellow with him pulled out a gun and told the gas station attendant to get 
in his car.  He then said that the gas station attendant tried to run away and that his friend shot the 
attendant.  At this point Mr. Butler stated that he ran away from them and didn’t look back.  He 
stated that he ran to a bus station where he caught a bus to Virginia and that in Virginia he caught 
another bus to New York where he had been until he was apprehended that morning.  We asked 
him if the other person was someone by the name of Elmer Lee and we had had communications 
from our Charlotte office saying that Elmer Lee had also been involved.  Butler said that Lee was 
there.” 
State v. Butler, 244 S.E.2d at 412 (quoting FBI agent’s testimony). 
283 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.  The conflict in the testimony on this 
point perhaps explains why Justice Kennedy relied only on the fact that Thompkins was 
literate and understood English in finding sufficient evidence that he understood his rights.  
See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010); see also supra note 244 and 
accompanying text. 
284 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 105–06 (1975). 
285 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
286 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2262. 
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referenced the importance of “‘reduc[ing] the impact of the Miranda rule on 
legitimate law enforcement.’”287  But the police conduct in Thompkins more 
closely resembled a deliberate effort to circumvent Miranda than one 
prompted by the needs of “legitimate law enforcement” or the “practical 
constraints” of interrogation.  The notification of rights paper Thompkins 
was given to sign was not a waiver of rights form; rather, it simply inquired 
whether he understood his rights.288  The police therefore may have made a 
strategic decision not to ask suspects whether they were willing to waive 
their rights, for fear that they would not get the answer they were looking 
for.289
C. INTERROGATING WITHOUT WAIVER 
  Whatever the intent of Detective Helgert and the Southfield, 
Michigan Police Department, the Court’s decision allows law enforcement 
officials who are determined to subvert Miranda to engage in this very 
behavior—to manipulate the implied waiver doctrine and make a case for 
waiver so long as they read the warnings in a language the suspect can 
understand and she eventually makes some incriminating statement, even 
hours into the interrogation session.  In so holding, Thompkins’s implied 
waiver discussion deviated substantially from both Supreme Court 
precedent and a pragmatic approach to Miranda. 
As damaging to Miranda as Thompkins’s invocation and implied 
waiver holdings were, the biggest blow to the landmark ruling came in the 
final portion of the Court’s decision.  In three quick paragraphs, the Court 
rejected Thompkins’s argument that the officers were required to wait until 
he had waived his rights before beginning to interrogate him.  So long as 
the police make sure a suspect “receives adequate Miranda warnings, 
understands them, and has an opportunity to invoke the rights before giving 
any answers or admissions,” the Court said, they may start the interrogation 
process even though the suspect “has neither invoked nor waived” 
Miranda.290
 
287 Id. at 2261 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)). 
  In combination with the Court’s implied waiver analysis, the 
288 See supra note 178.  The form, entitled “Notification of Constitutional Rights and 
Statement,” was referred to by the State as a “notification form,” see Reply Brief at 7, 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 08-1470), and by the Solicitor General as an “advice of 
rights form.”  See Brief for the United States, supra note 227, at 2. 
289 Compare Weisselberg, supra note 149, at 1585 (reporting that “[a]dvanced [police] 
training on implied waivers is widespread” in California, and even though “express waivers 
are preferred for proof purposes,” some “trainers emphasize the legality and strategic 
advantages of implied waivers”), with Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–27, Thompkins, 
130 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 08-1470) (argument made by the Solicitor General’s office) (noting 
that federal agents often try to secure written waivers “to avoid . . . problems of proof” at 
trial). 
290 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263, 2264. 
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pre-waiver interrogation part of the opinion reduces Miranda to a mere 
formality, essentially mandating only that the police remember to 
administer the warnings and otherwise reinstating the voluntariness due 
process test Miranda was designed to replace. 
Surprisingly, this portion of the Court’s opinion did not elicit much 
reaction from the four dissenters,291 even though it contradicted well-
established assumptions made in both prior Supreme Court opinions and the 
lower courts that the proper sequencing is warnings-waiver-interrogation.  
Although the majority did not discuss the lower courts’ treatment of this 
issue, its decision went well beyond the prevailing lower court practice: 
most courts had not allowed the police to keep a suspect in interrogation292 
for almost three hours before securing a Miranda waiver.293
The Thompkins majority did, however, claim that its decision was 
consistent with its own precedent, even Miranda itself.  In fact, the Court 
set the stage for this part of the opinion when it first introduced Miranda 
without any reference to waiver, simply describing the case as having 
“formulated a warning that must be given to suspects before they can be 
subjected to custodial interrogation.”
 
294  Then, in the portion of the opinion 
approving pre-waiver interrogation, the Court cited Miranda for two 
propositions: first, that a suspect’s confession is not “admissible at trial” 
unless she received Miranda warnings;295 and second, that once the 
administration of warnings has been proven, the courts may “proceed to 
consider” whether the suspect waived her rights.296  (Notably, the Court had 
no support for the sentence that followed—that in evaluating whether the 
evidence suffices to demonstrate a valid waiver of Miranda, the courts “of 
course” may “consider[] . . . the whole course of questioning.”297
Although the Court did not specify the precise language in Miranda on 
which it was relying for either proposition, both the State of Michigan and 
the Solicitor General quoted language found on the same pages cited by the 
Court in support of their theory that only the warnings themselves (and not 
) 
 
291 The dissent did point out, however, that “many contemporary police training 
resources instruct officers to obtain a waiver of rights prior to proceeding at all with an 
interrogation.”  Id. at 2270 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
292 As discussed above, see supra note 193, there was no dispute that Thompkins was 
subjected to interrogation. 
293 See supra notes 250–54 and accompanying text (citing cases where suspects freely 
participated in the conversation from the beginning). 
294 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2259. 
295 Id. at 2264 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966)). 
296 Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476). 
297 Id. 
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a preliminary waiver) are “an absolute prerequisite to interrogation,”298 
whereas both the warnings and proof of waiver are “prerequisites to the 
admissibility” of the defendant’s confession in court.299  Thus, these parties 
took the position that Miranda’s “unstated point here” was that the police 
are allowed to interrogate as soon as they read the warnings, but the 
prosecution may not introduce any statement emerging from that 
interrogation until “it establishes that a waiver occurred.”300
First, other portions of the Miranda opinion linked the concept of 
“warnings and waiver” together, thus explicitly repudiating the Thompkins 
Court’s approval of pre-waiver interrogation.  The Miranda Court noted, 
for example, that “[t]he requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a 
fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply 
a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.”
  This 
formalistic interpretation of Chief Justice Warren’s words, while literally 
accurate, contradicts other language in his opinion, undermines the Miranda 
Court’s fundamental assumptions about police interrogation, and 
contravenes the very notion of waiver. 
301
Second, the notion that police may conduct interrogations before 
obtaining a waiver contravenes Miranda’s fundamental premise about the 
inherent coerciveness of police interrogation—that, in the words of Chief 
Justice Warren, “the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll 
on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.”
  This language 
suggested that both the administration of Miranda warnings and the 
elicitation of a waiver are at minimum the “preliminary ritual” necessary 
before interrogation may begin. 
302
 
298 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471 (emphasis added), quoted in Brief for the United States, 
supra note 
  Even 
though the Miranda decision was a compromise—it did not go so far as to 
place a lawyer in every interrogation room, prohibit particular interrogation 
227, at 20–21; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 178, at 41 (relying on 
Miranda’s statement that a suspect must “‘be warned prior to any questioning’” in support of 
the same argument) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479). 
299 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added), quoted in Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
178, at 40 and Brief for the United States, supra note 227, at 21; see also Reply Brief, supra 
note 288, at 15–16 (citing Miranda’s statement that a confession is inadmissible “‘unless and 
until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial’” in support of 
the same argument) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479). 
300 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 178, at 41; see also Brief for the United States, supra 
note 227, at 20–21 (making the same argument). 
301 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added); see also id. at 477 (observing that “[t]he 
principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege 
against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation”). 
302 Id. at 455. 
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techniques, or put an end to interrogation altogether303
In fact, the Miranda opinion repeatedly spoke of the compulsion that 
continues to pervade the interrogation room after warnings are read.  For 
example, the Court recognized that even “[o]nce warnings have been 
given . . . , the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual 
to overcome free choice.”
—the Court was not 
naive enough to believe that the coercive potential of interrogation suddenly 
disappears as soon as a suspect is read her rights. 
304  Likewise, in discussing the importance of the 
right to counsel, the Miranda Court noted that “[t]he circumstances 
surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear 
the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators.”305  
Therefore, the Court realistically acknowledged, “[a] once-stated warning, 
delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation,” cannot dispel the 
inherent compulsion characterizing the interrogation process.306
Finally, Thompkins’s concept of pre-waiver interrogation flies in the 
face of the fundamental essence of waiver.  By waiving Miranda, a suspect 
is giving up her right not to be interrogated if she prefers not to speak to the 
police at all or wishes to do so only with the assistance of an attorney.  
Thus, the notion of pre-waiver interrogation allows the police to conduct a 
procedure that requires a waiver and hope that evidence of that waiver will 
turn up later.  No one would argue that the police may begin a warrantless 
consent search without first obtaining consent,
  The same 
Court could not have envisioned that the police would merely read the 
required warnings and then immediately launch into what the Court saw as 
an inherently coercive process without first securing a waiver. 
307 or that the prosecutor may 
start calling witnesses at trial in the absence of defense counsel unless the 
defendant has already waived the right to counsel,308
 
303 See supra notes 
 and then rely on “the 
6–8 and accompanying text. 
304 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74. 
305 Id. at 469; see also Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1203 (2010) (quoting this 
language in making the same point). 
306 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469; see also id. at 469–70 (likewise observing that “[a] mere 
warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end”).  The 
Court has reiterated this point on other occasions.  See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 
153–54 (1990) (noting that Miranda “specifically rejected [the] theory that [even] the 
opportunity to consult with one’s attorney would substantially counteract the compulsion 
created by custodial interrogation,” given that “[a] single consultation with an attorney does 
not remove the suspect from . . . the coercive pressures that accompany custody”). 
307 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (allowing searches without 
probable cause or a warrant if “conducted pursuant to consent”). 
308 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (deciding that criminal defendants 
have a Sixth Amendment right to “proceed without counsel” at trial if they “voluntarily and 
intelligently elect[] to do so”) (emphasis omitted). 
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whole course” of subsequent developments to prove the necessary 
waiver.309
Thus, the more plausible explanation for the language in Miranda 
quoted by the State and Solicitor General is that everyone assumed the 
proper sequencing would be warnings-waiver-interrogation and Chief 
Justice Warren never considered the possibility that the few isolated 
references to “warnings” preceding interrogation would be interpreted 
literally and not as shorthand for the whole “warnings and waiver” process.  
Certainly, that is how the majority opinion was interpreted by the Miranda 
dissenters,
 
310 and how it has been read by later Supreme Court opinions,311
 
309 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 
91, 98 (1984) (per curiam) (holding that a suspect’s “subsequent statements” cannot be used 
to cast doubt on her prior invocation of Miranda rights, but instead are “relevant only to the 
question” whether she later waived the rights she had previously invoked).  But cf. Laurent 
Sacharoff, Miranda’s Hidden Right, 3–4 (Working Paper Series Nov. 18, 2010) (draft), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711410 (posted Nov. 19, 2010) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court has implicitly treated the Miranda right to silence as encompassing “two 
distinct sub-rights”—the right “literally not to speak” and the right “to cut off police 
questioning”—and has required affirmative invocation only of the latter, thus allowing the 
police to begin interrogation so long as the suspect “has not invoked his right to cut off 
police questioning,” but refusing to admit any confession that results from the interrogation 
absent proof that “he waived the right not to speak”). 
 
310 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 526 (White, J., dissenting) (opening his dissent by objecting 
that “[t]he proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-custody 
interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority opinion and without a clear 
waiver of counsel has no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the language 
of the Fifth Amendment”); id. at 537 (describing the majority opinion as “declar[ing] that the 
accused may not be interrogated without counsel present, absent a waiver of the right to 
counsel”); id. at 502 (Clark, J., dissenting) (protesting that “even in Escobedo the Court 
never hinted that an affirmative ‘waiver’ was a prerequisite to questioning”); id. at 521 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (illustrating his observation that the FBI procedure in effect at that 
time “falls sensibly short of the Court’s formalistic rule[]” by noting that “there is no 
indication that FBI agents must obtain an affirmative ‘waiver’ before they pursue their 
questioning”). 
311 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting, in 
explaining the procedures dictated by Miranda, that “failure to give the prescribed warnings 
and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of 
any statements obtained”) (emphasis added); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 
(1994) (describing the Miranda rules and observing, “[i]f the suspect effectively waives his 
right to counsel after receiving the Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to 
question him”); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986) (pointing out that the police 
“followed [the Miranda] procedures with precision,” and explaining that they “administered 
the required warnings, sought to assure that respondent understood his rights, and obtained 
an express written waiver prior to eliciting each of the three statements”). 
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by the authors of interrogation manuals,312 and by commentators.313  In fact, 
in a recent symposium honoring Miranda’s fortieth anniversary, both a 
persistent critic of the decision and one of its most ardent supporters made 
that same assumption.314  As Professor Kamisar pointed out, “[t]he 
assertion of rights or their waiver is supposed to occur shortly after the 
curtain goes up—not postponed until the second or third act.”315
Although the Thompkins majority’s discussion of pre-waiver 
interrogation did include two somewhat cryptic citations to Miranda, the 
Court derived its primary precedential support from Butler.  That is, the 
Court argued that the implied waiver doctrine was “inconsistent with a rule 
that requires a waiver at the outset.”
 
316  But, while Butler did suggest that 
Miranda waivers can be inferred from “a course of conduct indicating 
waiver,” it did not specify when that “course of conduct” must occur.317  
The question of timing or sequencing was not before the Court in that case.  
In fact, allowing police to conduct pre-waiver interrogation and then 
support a finding of implied waiver based on “the whole course of 
questioning”318 is contrary to what Butler (and, of course, Miranda) 
expressly provided—that proof of implied waiver cannot be premised 
simply on a confession.319
 
312 This includes both manuals published in the wake of Miranda, see INBAU & REID, 
supra note 
 
7, at 1 (commenting, one year after Miranda, that police may conduct 
interrogations “after the recently prescribed warnings have been given to the suspect. . . , and 
after he has waived his self-incrimination privilege and his right to counsel”), as well as 
contemporary ones.  See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2270 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(citing recent manuals, including the current edition of the Inbau and Reid book); Brief for 
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Civil Liberties 
Union as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 11–12, Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 
08-1470) (same). 
313 See, e.g., 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.1(c), at 607 (introducing Miranda by 
explaining that it protects a suspect from being “questioned unless he waived his rights after 
being advised” of the required warnings); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police 
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 
839, 858–59 (1996) (observing that a suspect “can refuse at the start of an interview to waive 
his rights. . . , thus precluding any interview”); Weisselberg, supra note 149, at 1529 (noting 
that Miranda “characterized the warnings and waivers as procedural predicates that must be 
met before questioning could be initiated”). 
314 See Ronald J. Allen, The Misguided Defenses of Miranda v. Arizona, 5 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 205, 211 (2007) (observing that “in one sense Miranda is quite precise: give the 
warnings and get a waiver or you can’t engage in custodial interrogation”); Kamisar, supra 
note 4, at 172 (likewise noting that Miranda “conditions [custodial police questioning] on 
the giving of certain warnings by the police and the obtaining of waivers”). 
315 Kamisar, supra note 4, at 188. 
316 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263. 
317 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). 
318 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264. 
319 See supra notes 255, 257 and accompanying text. 
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Nevertheless, the Thompkins Court pointed to language in Butler 
indicating that waiver can be inferred from “‘the actions and words of the 
person interrogated.’”320
The Thompkins Court also observed that the Butler majority “rejected 
the rule proposed” by Justice Brennan in dissent, who would have 
“‘require[ed] the police to obtain an express waiver of [Miranda rights] 
before proceeding with interrogation.’”
  But Butler’s reference to “the person interrogated” 
does not signal that police may begin the interrogation process without first 
securing a waiver of Miranda (whether express or implied).  Given that the 
issue of sequencing never arose in Butler, the more plausible reading of this 
phrase is that the Court was using “the person interrogated” as a synonym 
for “the suspect” or “the defendant.” 
321  As discussed in the prior section, 
however, the Butler Court’s attention was focused on the question whether 
Miranda allowed implied waivers at all or instead required that they be 
express, and not on the timing of those waivers.322
Like the Thompkins majority, the State of Michigan and the Solicitor 
General also relied on Butler, echoing the Court’s point that “the decision in 
Butler clearly contemplates pre-waiver interrogation.”
  Thus, while the Justices 
in the Butler majority obviously did not subscribe to Justice Brennan’s 
dissenting views, what they presumably objected to was his requirement of 
an “express waiver” and not his suggestion—which simply reflected the 
widely held assumption post Miranda—that any waiver must occur 
“before” interrogation. 
323  Their briefs 
maintained that without pre-waiver interrogation, nothing is left of the 
implied waiver doctrine because police are “effectively requir[ed] to obtain 
an express waiver from the inception of the interview.”324  But the Court 
and the parties are wrong to suggest that there is no work for the implied 
waiver doctrine to do if the police must secure a waiver of Miranda prior to 
initiating interrogation.  Butler, for example, sent conflicting signals as to 
his willingness to waive his rights, but his refusal to sign the waiver form 
was not fatal to the prosecution’s waiver argument given his verbal 
agreement to talk to the FBI and his ready response to questions.325
 
320 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263 (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 373). 
  Thus, 
the concept of implied waiver is still necessary to support a finding of 
321 Id. (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 379 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added). 
322 See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
323 Reply Brief, supra note 288, at 16; see also Brief for the United States, supra note 
227, at 21 (“A rule demanding pre-interrogation waiver also would be inconsistent with the 
Court’s implied waiver doctrine.”). 
324 Reply Brief, supra note 288, at 18.  
325 See Butler, 441 U.S. at 371.  Butler was decided before the Court accepted the 
concept of qualified waiver in Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987). 
428 KIT KINPORTS [Vol. 101 
waiver in cases where a suspect equivocates about her intentions.  
Moreover, the notion of implied waiver is responsive to the contention that, 
even though Butler waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to speak to 
the FBI, he never waived his Miranda right to counsel.326  Additionally, as 
Justice Alito suggested at oral argument, the implied waiver doctrine 
enables the police to interrogate a suspect who does not agree to talk but 
does express a willingness at least to listen to the police officer’s 
questions.327  Similarly, the suspect who initiates a conversation with the 
police following the administration of Miranda warnings has impliedly 
waived her rights and is subject to interrogation.328
In addition to Miranda and Butler, the Thompkins majority also relied 
on Davis v. United States to support its approval of pre-waiver 
interrogation, specifically Davis’s observation that “the primary protection 
afforded suspects subject[ed] to custodial interrogation is the Miranda 
warnings themselves.”
  Accordingly, Butler 
cannot reasonably be interpreted as upsetting the Miranda Court’s 
assumptions about the proper sequencing of warnings-waiver-interrogation, 
and the continued vitality of the implied waiver doctrine provides no 
justification for allowing pre-waiver interrogation. 
329
 
326 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
  Here again, however, the Court took this 
statement out of context.  As discussed in the prior section, the Davis Court 
was observing in this part of the opinion that the “primary protection” given 
178, at 33; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra 
note 289, at 20 (argument made by Solicitor General’s office).  Note, however, that the 
Court has never required that each of the Miranda rights be waived individually, but has 
assumed that a suspect who responds affirmatively when asked whether she is “willing to 
waive her rights” or “willing to talk to us” has made a valid waiver of Miranda.  See, e.g., 
Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1200 (2010) (noting that Powell said that he was 
“‘willing to talk’ to the officers”) (quoting Powell v. State, 969 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2007)); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 567 (1987) (“Spring then signed a 
written form stating that he understood and waived his rights, and that he was willing to 
make a statement and answer questions.”); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 160 (1986) 
(“Respondent stated that he understood these rights but he still wanted to talk about the 
murder.”). 
327 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 289, at 32.  Although Justice Kennedy 
commented that Thompkins’s behavior “implied the very kind of statement” Justice Alito 
posited, id. at 37, a suspect who is in custody, and therefore by definition cannot get up and 
leave the room, does not indicate a willingness to listen to the police by spending more than 
two hours “looking down” and speaking a few words “very sporadically.”  Joint Appendix, 
supra note 181, at 152a, 9a. 
328 E.g., United States v. Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1998) (suspect asked to 
“talk confidentially” to an FBI agent); Stawicki v. Israel, 778 F.2d 380, 383–84 (7th Cir. 
1985) (finding that suspect’s “request to speak to” another detective who had left the room 
“prior to confessing indicated his willingness to make a statement”). 
329 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994), quoted in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010). 
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suspects is Miranda’s first layer (the warning and waiver procedures set out 
in Miranda itself) and that suspects must act affirmatively in order to 
trigger the “‘second layer of [Miranda] prophylaxis’” (the protections 
accorded suspects who invoke their rights).330  But Davis did not purport to 
effect any changes in the first layer or to disturb the warnings-waiver-
interrogation sequencing that Miranda envisioned—and that was 
scrupulously followed by the investigators who questioned Davis.331
Not only did the Thompkins Court misconstrue the precedents it did 
cite, it also ignored the implications of the decision in Oregon v. 
Bradshaw.
 
332  Bradshaw invoked his right to counsel, thus placing himself 
under the protective shield of Edwards, but a plurality of the Court found 
that he then lost the Edwards protection by asking, “Well, what’s going to 
happen to me now?” and thereby “‘initiat[ing] dialogue with the 
authorities.’”333  The opinion did not end there, however.  Rather, the 
plurality said—and all but Justice Powell agreed334—that “[s]ince there was 
no violation of the Edwards rule in this case” (given Bradshaw’s initiation), 
“the next inquiry” was whether the prosecution had sustained its burden of 
proving that Bradshaw had “‘validly waive[d]’” his rights.335





330 Id. at 458 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991)).  For further 
discussion of this language, see supra notes 
 suggests that Miranda divided the universe of suspects into 
three categories: those who invoke their rights (and fall under the protection 
of Edwards or Mosley), those who waive their rights (and may be 
interrogated), and those who neither invoke nor waive their rights.  The last 
group—the suspects in limbo as it were—are not entitled to the special 
266–72 and accompanying text. 
331 See Davis, 512 U.S. at 454–55. 
332 Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (plurality opinion). 
333 Id. at 1044–46 (quoting Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 46 (1982) (per curiam)) 
(concluding that Bradshaw’s question was not “merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the 
incidents of the custodial relationship,” but instead “evinced a willingness and a desire for a 
generalized discussion about the investigation”).  Justice Marshall’s dissent rightly pointed 
out, however, that the question “might well have evinced a desire for a ‘generalized’ 
discussion” if “posed by Jean-Paul Sartre before a class of philosophy students,” but here 
showed only Bradshaw’s “‘desire’ . . . to find out where the police were going to take him.”  
Id. at 1055 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
334 See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1050 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that 
a “two-step analysis could confound the confusion” surrounding Edwards). 
335 Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n.9 
(1981)) (emphasis added). 
336 Id. at 1045 (calling the initiation and waiver “inquiries . . . separate,” and rejecting the 
state court’s view that a suspect’s “‘initiation’ of a conversation or discussion . . . not only 
satisfied the Edwards rule, but ex proprio vigore sufficed to show a waiver of the previously 
asserted right to counsel”). 
430 KIT KINPORTS [Vol. 101 
protections afforded by Edwards and Mosley, but they may not be subjected 
to interrogation until they execute a waiver of their rights.  Bradshaw’s 
initiation of further discussion with the police took him out of the 
“invocation” box and returned him to “limbo.”  But the police could not 
justify interrogating him until they were able to move him into the “waiver” 
box by securing some sort of waiver of his Miranda rights.  Thus, the 
Bradshaw plurality pointed out, Edwards barred “further interrogation” of a 
suspect who asserted the right to counsel (and did nothing to initiate further 
communication), but Edwards “did not . . . hold that the ‘initiation’ of a 
conversation by a defendant . . . would amount to a waiver of a previously 
invoked right to counsel.”337
Bradshaw’s support for the notion that Miranda created three 
classifications of suspects cannot be reconciled with Thompkins’s concept 
of pre-waiver interrogation.  The Thompkins Court effectively saw only two 
types of suspects: those who invoke their rights and those who waive them.  
Thus, in putting Thompkins in the latter category, the Court reasoned that 
“a suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has 
not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making 
an uncoerced statement to the police.”
 
338  By thereby assuming that every 
suspect who has not invoked her rights is deemed to have waived them and 
eliminating the “limbo” box, the Court undermined the well-established 
propositions that suspects may not be presumed to have waived their 
rights339 and that silence does not constitute waiver.340  Likewise, it 
contradicted the admonition that waiver and invocation are “entirely distinct 
inquiries” that should not be “blurred” or “merg[ed] together.”341
Not only is the three-box paradigm faithful to Supreme Court 
precedent, it also resolves the slippery slope concerns raised at oral 
argument in Thompkins.  Until the police administer Miranda warnings and 
secure a waiver, they may not engage in any behavior that rises to the level 
of “interrogation” under Rhode Island v. Innis,
 
342 whether they do so for 
hours (as in Thompkins) or only for a few minutes.343
 
337 Id. at 1044. 
  On the other hand, 
338 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010). 
339 See supra notes 258–59 and accompanying text. 
340 See supra notes 255, 257 and accompanying text. 
341 Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam); see also supra notes 241–42 
and accompanying text. 
342 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980); see supra note 74. 
343 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 289, at 51–52 (Justice Kennedy and 
Chief Justice Roberts asking Thompkins’s attorney whether her “argument would be the 
same if [the interview] was compressed to 45 minutes” or even “30 seconds”). 
2011] LOVE–HATE RELATIONSHIP WITH MIRANDA 431 
anything they do short of “interrogation” prior to obtaining a waiver does 
not violate the warnings-waiver-interrogation sequencing.344
In addition to trying to shoehorn its decision into its precedents, the 
Thompkins majority also attempted to defend pre-waiver interrogation on 
pragmatic grounds.  In advancing its pragmatic argument, the Court made 
the interesting observation that the interrogation process can provide 
suspects with “additional information” and help them make “a more 
informed decision, either to insist on silence or to cooperate.”
 
345  This 
reasoning is fundamentally different from the core premise about the 
coerciveness of custodial interrogation that underlies Miranda and is 
reiterated in subsequent Supreme Court opinions.  Given that premise, the 
only “additional information” the police are likely to be willing to provide 
will be designed to “overbear the [suspect’s] will” and “trade[] on [her] 
weakness.”346  In Thompkins, for example, the officers admittedly were not 
trying to educate the suspect about his options, but to “[e]licit . . . 
information . . . pertinent to [the] investigation.”347  They did so by trying to 
convince him—erroneously, of course—that telling his side of the story was 
to his advantage,348 and even by giving him (in Detective Helgert’s words) 
“disinformation” about a confession his accomplice had purportedly 
made.349
Moreover, the Court’s pragmatic defense of pre-waiver interrogation 
explicitly rested on its assumption that when suspects are aware that 
Miranda rights “can be invoked at any time,” they have “the opportunity to 




344 The same analysis applies to the tactic of “softening up” suspects even prior to 
administering Miranda warnings.  See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Police Deception Before 
Miranda Warnings: The Case for Per Se Prohibition of an Entirely Unjustified Practice at 
the Most Critical Moment, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1239, 1260–62 (2007); Weisselberg, supra 
note 
  Although the 
Miranda opinion spoke of the importance of the “right to cut off 
questioning,” Chief Justice Warren did not include it among the four 
149, at 1555–57. 
345 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010). 
346 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 455 (1966); see also supra notes 302–06 and 
accompanying text. 
347 Joint Appendix, supra note 181, at 16a (testimony of Detective Helgert admitting that 
he spent “that whole period of time . . . using your skills as a detective and your training as a 
detective, and your experience as a human being, and police officer to attempt to [e]licit 
from Mr. Thompkins information which might be pertinent to your investigation for this 
offense”). 
348 See supra notes 181–82, 193 and accompanying text. 
349 Joint Appendix, supra note 181, at 149a (testimony of Detective Helgert). 
350 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264. 
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mandated warnings.351  Thus, Miranda does not require that suspects be 
told they can assert their rights and end the interrogation at any time—even 
though some police departments (like Southfield, Michigan352) have added 
this information to their Miranda forms.353  In jurisdictions that choose not 
to do so but only to supply the baseline of advice required by Miranda, 
suspects often do not realize that they can change their mind, invoke their 
rights, and thereby put an end to the interrogation.354
Finally, the Thompkins Court’s pragmatic argument is ironic given 
other Supreme Court cases where defendants have been the ones seeking 
“additional information.”  On those occasions, the Court has not hesitated to 
reject such requests on the ground that the police need not “supply a suspect 
with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding 
whether to speak,”
  In those cases, then, 
the Thompkins Court’s confidence that suspects can “reassess” their options 
is misplaced. 
355 or that “the additional information could affect only 
the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing 
nature.”356  Thus, the Court seems to envision that the flow of information 
is completely subject to the control of the police, despite Miranda’s efforts 
to “‘place the accused on a more equal footing with the police.’”357
 
351 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474; see also id. (envisioning that suspects may exercise their 
rights “at any time prior to or during questioning”); id. at 475–76 (noting that “where in-
custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is 
waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior 
to invoking his right to remain silent”). 
 
352 In addition to laying out the four basic Miranda rights, the waiver form provided to 
Thompkins said: “You have the right to decide at any time before or during questioning to 
use your right to remain silent and your right to talk with a lawyer while you are being 
questioned.”  Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256. 
353 See Rogers et al., supra note 155, at 131 (reporting that the “vast majority” of police 
departments surveyed included this information in their warnings).  For specific examples, 
see Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 567 
(1987); Godsey, supra note 59, at 806–07 n.100 (citing examples). 
354 See Godsey, supra note 59, at 783–84 (describing the Miranda warnings as “out of 
date,” in part because they do not include this information); Stuntz, supra note 25, at 988 
(finding that “[a]lmost no one invokes his Miranda rights once questioning has begun”); 
Thomas, supra note 6, at 228–29 (suggesting, therefore, that this information be required as 
part of Miranda warnings). 
355 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986) (ruling that police need not inform 
suspect that an attorney tried to contact him). 
356 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987) (holding that police need not tell 
suspect what crimes will be discussed during the interrogation); see also id. at 576 (“We 
have held that a valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all 
information ‘useful’ in making his decision or all information that ‘might . . . [affect] his 
decision to confess.’”) (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422). 
357 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.9(e), at 834 (quoting Recent Cases, Frazier v. 
United States, 419 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969), 26 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1076 (1973)). 
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This lack of symmetry is part of a larger pattern.  The Court has 
consistently been willing to give an expansive reading to statements made 
by the police and the suspect in the interrogation room when doing so 
favors the prosecution,358 but it has been much more literal and shown 
greater reluctance to adopt similarly generous interpretations that support 
the defendant.359  In fact, the decision in Thompkins seems all the more one-
sided given that the Court reached out to issue a wide-reaching substantive 
decision in a case that could have been resolved under the deferential 
AEDPA standard of review.360
From a pragmatic viewpoint, then, the Thompkins opinion falls short.  
By endorsing the police procedures used in that case, the Court reversed 
widely held assumptions about the proper sequencing of warnings-waiver-
interrogation and essentially eviscerated the Miranda doctrine.  A police 
officer may now read the Miranda warnings in a quick, bureaucratic tone of 
voice, trying to give the impression that they are mere formalities,
 
361 ask if 
the suspect understands (or just make sure she can read the form or speaks 
the language in which the warnings were given362), wait a split second to 
give her “an opportunity to invoke” her rights,363 and then immediately 
launch into the interrogation.  This strategy will be foolproof except in the 
unusual case where the suspect has the nerve to interrupt and speak up—
and can manage to do so with the specificity needed to satisfy the strict 
unequivocal invocation standard.364
 
358 See supra notes 
  And, given Thompkins’s implied 
waiver holding, any statement the suspect makes—even a one-word 
response that comes hours into the interrogation session—is then 
160–72, 332–33 and accompanying text (discussing Florida v. 
Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010), and Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (plurality 
opinion)). 
359 See supra notes 197–200, 213, 222–40 and accompanying text (discussing Davis v. 
United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), and Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010)). 
360 Compare Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264 (concluding that the state court’s rejection of 
Thompkins’s Miranda claim was “correct under de novo review and therefore necessarily 
reasonable under the more deferential AEDPA standard of review”), with id. at 2266 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for ignoring “longstanding principles of 
judicial restraint,” which “counsel leaving for another day the questions of law the Court 
reaches out to decide”).  For the standard of review mandated by the AEDPA, see supra note 
195. 
361 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
362 See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
363 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263. 
364 For cases illustrating how high a hurdle this has proven to be, see supra note 225 and 
accompanying text. 
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considered conclusive evidence that she impliedly waived her Miranda 
rights.365
In so holding, the Court basically reduced Miranda to a formality, 
requiring only that the police remember to read the warnings.  As such, the 
Court allowed the police to engage in tactics not far removed from the 
“question first” strategy disapproved in Missouri v. Seibert.
 
366  To be sure, 
the quick recital of warnings came first here rather than midway through the 
interrogation, but it is difficult to see how “a reasonable person in 
[Thompkins’s] shoes” would have thought “he had a genuine right to 
remain silent” when Detective Helgert immediately began the interrogation 
process and persisted for almost three hours in the face of almost complete 
silence on Thompkins’s part.367  By the time Thompkins made an 
incriminating comment, a reasonable person “would not have understood 
[the Miranda warnings] to convey a message that [he] retained a choice 
about continuing to [maintain his silence or instead to] talk.”368  Rather than 
requiring that the police “‘reasonably “conve[y]”’” Thompkins’s rights, as 
the Seibert plurality did, the Thompkins Court endorsed “a police strategy 
adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings.”369
Thompkins is reminiscent not only of Seibert but also of Dickerson, as 
it essentially pushes back to center stage the voluntariness due process test 
the Court sought to replace in Miranda.
 
370  Assuming the police administer 
the Miranda warnings, the only other road to suppression of a confession 
goes through the totality of the circumstances test.  Thus, when the 
Thompkins Court held that the implied waiver doctrine’s requirement of “a 
course of conduct indicating waiver” is satisfied simply by an “uncoerced 
statement,”371
 
365 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264 (holding that “a suspect who has received and 
understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right 
to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police”). 
 it went on to find that standard met on the facts before it 
using standard voluntariness due process analysis, looking at the totality of 
366 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 18–21 
and accompanying text. 
367 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617, 613. 
368 Id. at 617. 
369 Id. at 611 (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (quoting 
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981) (per curiam))). 
370 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); see supra notes 12–17 and 
accompanying text. 
371 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010); see supra notes 245–48 and 
accompanying text. 
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the circumstances and finding no “facts indicating coercion.”372  Similarly, 
at oral argument, when Thompkins’s attorney expressed concern that 
allowing the police to “immediately . . . go[] into interview mode” would 
lead to “badgering,” Chief Justice Roberts responded: “I thought there was 
no dispute on this record that there was no involuntariness.  We are talking 
about a violation of the technical, important but formal, Miranda 
requirements.  This is not a case where the person says: My statements were 
involuntary.”373
Moreover, in reaching the conclusion that there was no coercion 
undermining the validity of Thompkins’s implied waiver, the majority was 
basically satisfied that Thompkins was not “threatened or injured.”
 
374  The 
dissenters, by contrast, invoked Miranda’s admonition that a “lengthy 
interrogation” preceding a confession is “strong evidence” of an invalid 
waiver—that “the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is 
consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the 
interrogation finally forced him to do so [and] inconsistent with any notion 
of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege.”375  While the Thompkins 
majority did not cite this language, it found “no authority for the 
proposition that an interrogation of this length is inherently coercive.”376  In 
fact, it then went on to suggest that a finding of implied waiver could be 
made even in a case where the suspect held out longer than Thompkins did, 
noting that “even where interrogations of greater duration were held to be 
improper, they were accompanied, as this one was not, by other facts 
indicating coercion, such as an incapacitated and sedated suspect, sleep and 
food deprivation, and threats.”377
Obviously, this is not what the Miranda Court had in mind.  There the 
Court made clear that its concerns extended beyond the suspect whose 
 
 
372 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263; see also id. at 2262 (finding “‘no reason to require 
more in the way of a “voluntariness” inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the [due 
process] confession context’”) (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169–70 
(1986)). 
373 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 289, at 50.  Likewise, in response to 
Justice Scalia’s comment, “I assume, that you . . . acknowledge that if the interrogation 
had . . . gone on for so long that it had become coercive, then that . . . last statement 
would . . . not be a voluntary waiver,” the attorney from the Solicitor General’s Office 
replied: “That’s right.  But Respondent made a voluntariness argument throughout all of the 
courts in this case, and every court has rejected it.”  Id. at 30; see also State v. Kirtdoll, 136 
P.3d 417, 424 (Kan. 2006) (describing the implied waiver doctrine as “virtually 
indistinguishable” from the voluntariness test). 
374 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263. 
375 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966), quoted in Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 
2269 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
376 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263. 
377 Id. 
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confession would have been suppressed under the voluntariness due process 
test.  In fact, the Miranda opinion included an observation that would be an 
equally apt description of the facts of Thompkins:  
It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator’s 
imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will continue 
until a confession is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation is itself damning 
and will bode ill when presented to a jury.378
Thompkins may not have been “subnormal” or “woefully ignorant” enough, 
and the three-hour interrogation session may not have been “lengthy” 
enough, to allow him to argue “[m]y statements were involuntary” under 
the totality of the circumstances test.  But his inability to demonstrate 
coercion under the voluntariness due process test does not mean the police 
should have been allowed—in direct contravention of Miranda—to begin 
interrogating him before he had waived his rights, trying to convince him 
that “silence” would be “damning” and leaving him with the distinct 
impression that the interrogation was going to “continue” (despite his lack 
of participation) “until a confession [was] obtained.” 
 
The predominance given the voluntariness due process test in 
Thompkins is likewise inconsistent with Dickerson’s recognition that efforts 
to “reinstate[] the totality test” undermine Miranda.379  And it is even more 
anomalous given that the amorphous voluntariness due process test—which 
has always been a difficult standard to satisfy and has been “condemned as 
‘useless’ . . . ‘legal “double-talk”’”380—became an even higher hurdle after 
Miranda.  As Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in Dickerson, “‘cases 
in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-
incriminating statement was “compelled” despite the fact that the law 
enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.’”381
 
378 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468; see also id. at 457 (disapproving of even police 
interrogations that “do not evince overt physical coercion or patent psychological ploys”). 
  By 
allowing police to reorder the well-established warnings-waiver-
interrogation sequencing and reducing Miranda to a mere formality, the 
379 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000). 
380 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 n.4 (1985) (quoting Monrad G. Paulsen, The 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411, 430 (1954), and ALBERT 
R. BEISEL, JR., CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT 48 (1955)). 
381 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 
(1984)); see also Leo, supra note 24, at 1026 (noting that Miranda “creat[ed] a bright line 
but diminish[ed] the salience and effectiveness of the voluntariness test by lulling judges into 
admitting confessions with little inquiry into voluntariness”); Louis Michael Seidman, 
Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 745–46 (1992) (observing that, in the wake of 
Miranda, “many lower courts have adopted an attitude toward voluntariness claims that can 
only be called cavalier”). 
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Thompkins Court essentially resurrected the voluntariness due process test 
in contravention of Miranda, Dickerson, and any semblance of pragmatism. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s pragmatic approach to Miranda has enabled the 
Court to chip away at the landmark ruling over the years while stopping 
short of permitting deliberate attempts to subvert it.  The three Miranda 
decisions issued by the Supreme Court last Term—the first to come from 
the Roberts Court—certainly did nothing to stem the tide gradually 
weakening Miranda.  In fact, all eight of the issues resolved in the three 
cases were decided in favor of the prosecution.   
Interestingly, it was Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Maryland 
v. Shatzer382 that was most sensitive to the policy concerns underlying 
Miranda and most faithful to the Court’s pragmatic approach.  Both aspects 
of the Court’s decision in that case—the recognition of a break-in-custody 
exception to Edwards and the ruling that inmates serving prison terms are 
not continuously in custody for purposes of Miranda—endorsed the 
dominant lower court view and could be defended on pragmatic grounds.383
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Florida v. Powell
 
384 fell in the 
middle.  In upholding a warning that the state courts had interpreted as 
improperly limiting the right to counsel to the time period prior to 
interrogation, the Court acted inconsistently with the trend in the lower 
courts and extended its own precedents in the area.  In addition, the ruling is 
harder to justify on pragmatic grounds.  Nevertheless, the Court’s decision 
was relatively narrow and tied to the particular facts of the case, and 
therefore does not give the police a great deal of room to circumvent 
Miranda.385





382 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010). 
 however, can neither be discounted as an 
incremental change in the law nor reconciled with a pragmatic approach to 
Miranda.  By putting its stamp of approval on the interrogation techniques 
used in that case, the Court basically reduces Miranda’s sixty pages to a 
requirement that the police must not forget to read the warnings.  Assuming 
they are conveyed in a language the suspect can understand, the police are 
allowed to move directly into full interrogation mode and then use anything 
the suspect says—even hours later—to demonstrate that she impliedly 
383 See supra notes 37–111 and accompanying text. 
384 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010). 
385 See supra notes 112–76 and accompanying text. 
386 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
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waived her rights.  Thompkins thereby renders Miranda a mere formality 
and resurrects the voluntariness due process test, turning the Court’s love–
hate relationship with Miranda into one of pure disdain.  The fact that the 
Court chose to reach out unnecessarily and adopt far-reaching substantive 
changes on such critical issues—and then did so in such a cursory 
fashion—makes the opinion seem even more disrespectful.387
To the extent that the Court’s decisions from last Term, Thompkins in 
particular, signal a change in the Court’s commitment to the pragmatic 
approach, that shift comes at a fortuitous time for those advocating that 
Congress create an exception to Miranda for terrorism cases.
 
388  In true 
emergencies, of course, the government does not need additional legislative 
tools.  It can already rely on the “public safety exception” created in New 
York v. Quarles, which allowed law enforcement officials to dispense with 
Miranda warnings before asking questions “reasonably prompted by a 
concern for the public safety.”389
On the one hand, an exception for a particular category of cases would 
be narrower than the 1968 Crime Control Bill, which completely 
superseded Miranda and reinstated the voluntariness due process test in 
federal court.
 
390  In invalidating that statute, the Court reasoned in 
Dickerson v. United States that Miranda was a “constitutional decision” 
that may not be “overruled” by Congress.391
 
387 See supra notes 
  An “exception” for terrorism 
cases might be distinguished from an “overruling” and thus might survive 
constitutional scrutiny despite Dickerson.  Moreover, allowing interrogators 
to violate Miranda when questioning suspected terrorists seems relatively 
177–381 and accompanying text.  But cf. Friedman, supra note 21, at 
5 (arguing that the Court has engaged in the “stealth overruling” of Miranda for some 
time—by “disingenuous[ly] treat[ing] precedents in a manner that obscures fundamental 
change in the law” and thereby “avoid[s] public attention to the Court’s diminishing of its 
own precedents”). 
388 See Charlie Savage, Holder Backing Law to Restrict Miranda Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 
10, 2010, at A1 (reporting that the Obama Administration is considering asking Congress to 
create such an exception); see also Questioning of Terrorism Suspects Act of 2010, H.R. 
5934, 111th Cong. (2010) (bill introduced by Rep. Adam Schiff, which would express “the 
‘sense of Congress’” that Miranda’s public safety exception permits “unwarned 
interrogation of terrorism suspects for as long as is necessary to protect the public from 
pending or planned attacks when a significant purpose of the interrogation is to gather 
intelligence and not solely to elicit testimonial evidence”). 
389 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984). 
390 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006); see supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
391 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000). 
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tame compared with the “torture warrants” advocated by some 
commentators and therefore might be palatable to the Court.392
On the other hand, Dickerson suggests the Court might have similar 
qualms about a statutory exception for terrorism cases.  The Court might 
view a blanket exemption that goes beyond the public safety exception it 
already created in Quarles as unconstitutionally interfering with the judicial 
prerogative to interpret “constitutional decisions.”  Moreover, the Court has 
recently been sympathetic to Guantanamo detainees seeking to challenge 
their designation as enemy combatants in federal court.
 
393  But the Court’s 
refusal to carve out a “terrorism exception” for habeas corpus and 
completely foreclose the detainees from access to judicial proceedings does 
not necessarily mean it would likewise disapprove of efforts to deny 
suspected terrorists the protection of every “prophylactic” procedural rule394 
available to other criminal defendants.395
 
392 See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, 
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 131–64 (2002) (suggesting that judges should be permitted 
to issue “torture warrants” in extraordinary cases).  But cf. Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the 
Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 278, 324–25 (2003) (“conced[ing] that there is room for debate” on the morality 
of torture as an interrogation technique where necessary to avert “a threat of mass 
devastation,” but rejecting the idea of judges “announc[ing] before the fact that the 
Constitution permits torture”); John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected 
Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 743, 763–64 (2002) (taking 
the position that, although “the government should not have the authority to torture even 
in . . . extreme circumstances,” individual government agents should resort to torture if doing 
so “provides the last remaining chance to save lives that are in imminent peril” and then raise 
the necessity defense in “any resulting criminal prosecution”); Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 267 (2003) (arguing that “[w]ithout an absolute prohibition on the 
use of torture, it is virtually impossible to ensure that ‘special cases’ remain special”). 
  And certainly any decline in the 
Roberts Court’s enthusiasm for the pragmatic approach to Miranda is 
bound to affect this calculus. 
393 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (concluding that foreign nationals held at 
Guantanamo Bay may file federal habeas petitions to challenge the legality of their detention 
as enemy combatants); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (holding that 
the procedures created by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 were not “an adequate and 
effective substitute” for habeas); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633, 567 (2006) 
(finding that the Government had not shown a “practical need explain[ing] deviations from 
court-martial practice,” and therefore that the “structure and procedures” of the military 
commissions convened by President Bush violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
the Geneva Conventions). 
394 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974) (plurality opinion); see supra note 13 
and accompanying text. 
395 Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (refusing to allow a 
nonresident alien to rely on the Fourth Amendment, which grants certain rights to “the 
people” of the United States, to challenge a search by United States officials on foreign soil). 
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Given the multiple ways in which the police have adapted to and 
accommodated Miranda over the years and the overwhelming rate of 
Miranda waivers, perhaps Chief Justice Warren’s opinion was essentially a 
dead letter already, an “irrelevanc[y],”396 an “out of date”397 “mistake.”398
 
396 Leo, supra note 
  
If so, then Thompkins merely makes the demise of Miranda more 
transparent.  That transparency may motivate those who have been critical 
of Miranda for not going far enough to search for more meaningful ways to 
protect suspects from the coerciveness of custodial interrogation.  In the 
meantime, one cannot count on the current Supreme Court to adhere to the 
pragmatic approach to Miranda taken by its predecessors. 
24, at 1000. 
397 Godsey, supra note 59, at 783–84. 
398 Stuntz, supra note 25, at 975. 
